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Great Expectations: Privacy Rights in
Automobiles
RICHARD L. ALLEN* and JOHN A. SCHAEFER**
The authors examine the history of the standing doctrine as
it relates to the ability to contest searches and seizures. After
analyzing the cases in this area, the recent Supreme Court case
of Rakas v. Illinois is discussed and critiqued in depth. Cases
decided after Rakas serve as the backdrop for a discussion of the
exclusionary rule and the privacy rights of automobile passen-
gers. Finally, the authors propose an alternative to the Rakas
holding.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are currently over 100,000,000 automobiles on the road
in the United States, logging over 1,000,000,000,000 miles per year.'
In a recent year,each car traveled an average of twenty-eight miles
per day.2 It is thus apparent that automobile travel has become a
crucial part of our day-to-day living. Yet despite the abundant num-
ber of hours Americans spend each year in automobiles, the courts
have failed to acknowledge the actual expectations of privacy of
* Former Business Manager, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. University of Miami
School of Law, 1979.
** Former Member, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. University of Miami School
of Law, 1979.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION TRENDS AND CHOICES 86
(1977).
2. Id.
100 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
those who travel on the nation's roads.
This article addresses the treatment by the courts of privacy
rights as they relate to searches and seizures of automobiles and
their contents. The judiciary has been unrealistic in its treatment
of privacy expectations as reflected by the factors used to determine
one's privacy rights in any given vehicle.
Further, the judicially created doctrine known as the exclusion-
ary rule, which prevents evidence illegally obtained by the police
from being used to prosecute an accused criminal, is examined with
reference to the protection of privacy rights. Because search and
seizure limitations depend upon notions of privacy, this article also
analyzes the changing concepts of the judiciary regarding the right
to privacy. Finally, an alternative to the current judicial treatment
of the privacy expectations of automobile passengers is suggested.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF STANDING
A. Introduction
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, an&no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.3
In order to ensure the protection provided by this amendment, the
Supreme Court created a remedy which excludes from trial all evi-
dence obtained in violation of this constitutional safeguard., Before
a defendant can object to an unlawful search and attempt to have
the evidence obtained therefrom excluded, however, he must first
establish that he has standing to raise his fourth amendment con-
tention. This section analyzes the evolution of the law of standing
to challenge illegal searches and seizures, including the recent land-
mark Supreme Court standing case of Rakas v. Illinois.'
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule was applied
to trials in the state courts in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).




The problem of standing in fourth amendment cases has been
troublesome to both courts and commentators for a considerable
number of years.6 The primary question in a standing problem is not
whether a search is illegal, but rather whether the individual chal-
lenging the search has the legal ability to do so.'
Any analysis of the law of standing in privacy cases must begin
with Jones v. United States.' Jones was an occasional occupant of
a friend's apartment.9 He was present in the apartment when fed-
eral officers arrived with a search warrant and found narcotics. After
being charged with violating federal narcotics laws,'0 Jones moved
to suppress the narcotics on the ground that the warrant had been
issued without a showing of probable cause." The district court
denied the motion finding that Jones lacked standing." The Su-
preme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter
stated:
6. General notions of standing require that one have "such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presen-
tation of issues." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). While a defendant moving to
suppress incriminating evidence would seem to have "a personal stake in the outcome," that
alone is not sufficient to establish standing under the fourth amendment. See, e.g., United
States v. West, 453 F.2d 1351, 1353 (3d Cir. 1972). White & Greenspan, Standing to Object
to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 334 n.3 (1970) and articles cited therein.
7. "The issue [of standing] is inextricably bound to the philosophical underpinning of
the application of the exclusionary rule as a means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment."
United States v. West, 453 F.2d 1351, 1353 n.5 (3d Cir. 1972). See notes 141-44 and accompa-
nying text infra.
The discussions of standing by the Supreme Court often employ language which suggests
that a defendant's rights have not been violated. In effect, however, the Court has denied the
defendant the benefits of the exclusionary rule without regard to any violation of his fourth
amendment rights. This misstatement of the issues adds to the confusion surrounding the
exclusionary rule. See Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and
Standing to Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REV. 1, 1 (1975).
8. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Prior to Jones, a defendant was allowed standing only if he could
show that he had a possessory or proprietary interest in the property seized or the premises
searched. For cases and comments dealing with pre-Jones standing see Knox, supra note 7,
at 35 n.238; Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REV.
471 (1952).
9. Jones lived elsewhere, but had a key to the apartment and as a guest could use it at
will. He kept a suit and shirt in the apartment and had slept there "maybe a night." Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960).
10. Jones was charged with having purchased, sold, dispensed and distributed narcotics,
not in or from the originally stamped package, and with having facilitated the concealment
and sale of the same narcotics, knowing them to have been illegally imported into the United
States, violations of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1954) and 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1956) respectively. 362
U.S. at 258.
11. 362 U.S. at 259.
12. Id. at 259-60. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that
Jones lacked standing but that the evidence had been lawfully obtained.
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In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure" one must have been a victim of a search and
seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distin-
guished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of
evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed
at someone else.' 3
Thus, in order to obtain standing, one must establish "that he him-
self was the victim of an invasion of privacy."' 4 It is settled law that
one has no standing to challenge a search unless his own personal
rights have been violated.'"
The Court found that Jones had standing on two separate and
distinct grounds."' First, he had "automatic standing" because he
had been charged with a crime in which an essential element was
the possession of the item seized at the time of the search.'7 This
"automatic standing" rule was formulated to alleviate the preexist-
ing situation in which defendants, in order to exercise their fourth
amendment right, were compelled to claim a proprietary or posses-
sory interest in the property searched in order to obtain standing,"'
thereby relinquishing their fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.'" This inequity was further compounded by the gov-
ernment's ability to take advantage of the defendant's paradox-if
the defendant did not claim a possessory interest, he had no stand-
ing, but he could still be convicted of possession. The Court stated
that "ilt is not consonant with the amenities, to put it mildly, of
the administration of criminal justice to sanction such squarely con-
13. 362 U.S. at 261. Although the Court was dealing specifically with interpreting the
language of rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Jones holding is
applicable to any type of criminal standing case. The Court has stated that rule 41(e) con-
forms to the general standard and is no broader than the constitutional rule. Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173 n.6 (1969).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969); Tileston v. Ullman,
318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943).
16. 362 U.S. at 263.
17. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) provides an excellent example of how
this portion of the Jones holding has been applied. The defendants were convicted of trans-
porting and conspiring to transport stolen goods in interstate commerce. The charges against
them were limited to acts committed before the day of the alleged illegal search. Thus, they
had no automatic standing under Jones since the charges did not depend upon possession of
the seized items at the time of the contested search.
18. See authorities cited in note 8 supra.
19. The defendant was "obligated to choose one horn of the dilemma." Connolly v.
Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932); see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 391




tradictory assertions of power by the Government."I" Therefore, the
Court afforded Jones automatic standing and did not actually need
to determine whether he had an interest in the premises searched
or the property seized."'
The Court continued its analysis, however, by finding that
Jones had standing because he had the "legally requisite interest in
the premises." 2 The Court frankly admitted that it had never de-
fined the extent of an individual's interest in the searched premises
required to maintain a motion to suppress.23 After analyzing lower
court decisions in this area, the Court went beyond property con-
cepts in its assessment of "requisite interest":
[It is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law sur-
rounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined
by the common law in evolving the body of private property law
which, . . .has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical. . . . Distinctions such as those between
"lessee," "licensee," "invitee" and "guest," . . . ought not to be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
constitutional safeguards.2
With property concepts no longer a hindrance, the Court proceeded
to fashion the rule that "anyone legitimately on [the] premises
where a search occurs may challenge its legality by way of a motion
to suppress, when its fruits are proposed to be used against him." 5
Persons legitimately on the premises were included in the cate-
gory of those who have a legally requisite interest in the searched
premises. Although Justice Frankfurter's rationale for this inclusion
is somewhat sketchy, it can be surmised that the Justices recognized
the view that one's security or privacy is invaded whenever he is
legitimately present during a search. Jones, although eliminating
20. 362 U.S. at 263-64. For an argument that there was no contrary position on the part
of the government in Jones and that the automatic standing rule should be abolished, see
Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 421, 444 (1975).
21. 362 U.S. 263-65. The Court reasoned that, "[tihe same element in this prosecution
which has caused a dilemma, i.e., that possession both convicts and confers standing, elimi-
nates any necessity for a preliminary showing of an interest in the premises searched or the
property seized, which ordinarily is required when standing is challenged." Id. at 263.
22. Id. at 263.
23. Id. at 265.
24. Id. at 266.
25. Id. at 267. Jones was legitimately on the premises since the owner of the apartment
had consented to his presence. In contrast, a burglar or a trespasser would not have standing,
as his presence on the premises would be wrongful. See, e.g., United States v. Cassell, 542
F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1976); State v. Winckler, 260 N.W.2d 356 (S.D. 1977).
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property concepts as a talisman in search and seizure standing ques-
tions, did not eliminate standing based on a showing of possessory
or proprietary interest in the premises searched or the property
seized.26
The Jones decision eliminated the defendant's dilemma
through its automatic standing holding for possessory type offenses;
it did not, however, address nonpossession cases. Simmons v.
United States" presented that question eight years later. The lower
court ruled that the defendant, charged with robbery, could only
gain standing to object to the admission of a suitcase" by testifying
that he was its owner. If he were to testify to ownership at the
hearing on the motion to suppress, however, he took the risk that
his testimony would later be used to incriminate him. On appeal,
the Supreme Court found it "intolerable that one constitutional
right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another"" and
held that "when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to
suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony
may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of
guilt unless he makes no objection."0 Consequently, Simmons ex-
tended the rationale of Jones to nonpossessory offenses and elimi-
nated the dilemma confronting defendants who wished to gain
standing by asserting proprietary ownership of a seized item.'
While Simmons dealt with an aspect of the first holding in
Jones, Mancusi v. DeForte31 concerned Jones' alternative holding,
the "legitimately on [the] premises" rule. State officials had seized
records from an office of the Teamsters Union shared by DeForte
and others without a warrant while he was present and despite his
26. An example of standing based upon a possessory interest in the property seized
without an interest in the premises searched may be seen in United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48 (1951). The defendant was granted standing to contest an illegal search of his aunt's hotel
room on the basis of his property interest in the items seized (19 bottles of cocaine). Id. at
53. See White & Greenspan, supra note 6, at 344.
27. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
28. The suitcase had been seized from the basement of a house in which the defendant
had no interest. Id. at 391.
29. Id. at 394.
30. Id. The defendant's dilemma, however, is not fully relieved. See United States v.
Kahan, 415 U.S. 239 (1974) (defendant's pretrial statements denying sufficient funds to
obtain counsel used against him in the government's case in chief. Simmons inapplicable
because incriminating component of the defendant's pretrial statement was knowledge of its
falsity). ,
See also People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 317 N.E.2d 545 (1974) (defendant's testimony
at trial impeached through introduction of prior statements at a motion to suppress).
31. Jones might not have withstood the Simmons rationale. See Brown v. United States,
411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973); note 136 infra.
32. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
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protests.33 The seized records were admitted at his trial for conspir-
acy, coercion and extortion. The Supreme Court first considered
DeForte's standing to object to the seizure of the records. The Court
acknowledged that the records seized were the property of the union
and not DeForte and that for him to acquire standing, the search
must have violated his personal rights.34 Although the defendant
was "legitimately on [the] premises" searched, the Court found it
necessary to analyze the question of standing in light of its then
recent decision in Katz v. United States:
35
Katz . . . makes it clear that capacity to claim the protection of
the Amendment depends not upon a property right in the in-
vaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there
was a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental
intrusion. . . . The crucial issue, therefore, is whether, in light
of all the circumstances, DeForte's office was such a place.
3
1
Because Jones had eliminated the requirement of legal possession
and ownership, it made no difference that DeForte shared the office
and that it was owned by the union. 7 Relying upon the Katz reason-
ing, the Court held that DeForte had standing because:
DeForte . . . could reasonably have expected that only those
persons [union employers and employees] and their personal or
business guests would enter the office, and that records would not
be touched except with their permission . . . . This expectation
was inevitably defeated by the entrance of state officials . . .3
Mancusi thus switched from a rigid application of the Jones
"legitimately on [the] premises" test to a determination of one's
reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises searched. Justice
Black criticized this extension in his dissent:
DeForte clearly was "legitimately on [the] premises" and thus
his standing should be obvious. . . without the Court's extended
discussion of "reasonable expectation" . . . . This reasoning in
terms of "expectations," however, requires conferring standing
33. Id. at 365.
34. Id. at 367.
35. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. 392 U.S. at 368 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
37. The fourth amendment's "protection" from unreasonable searches and seizures ap-
plies to business premises as well as to residences. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499
(1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920); 3 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 563 (1978).
38. 392 U.S. at 369.
39. Under this new analysis, the Court compared the facts in Jones with those in
Mancusi and determined that the Jones test would have produced the same result. Id. at 370.
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without regard to whether the agent happens to be present at the
time of the search or not, a rather remarkable consequence of the
statement in Jones.
40
Until recently, the last major Supreme Court fourth amend-
ment "standing" case was Alderman v. United States.4' There, peti-
tioners were convicted of conspiring to transmit murderous threats
in interstate commerce. 2 The petitioners subsequently discovered
that the place of business of one of the petitioners had been subject
to electronic surveillance by the government.43 The petitioners
argued that any illegally obtained evidence used to convict any one
defendant should not be admissible against any other co-defendant
or co-conspirator."
Writing for the majority, Justice White rejected this argument
stating that there are no special standing rules for co-conspirators
and that the Court was bound by "[tihe established principle...
that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation
can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated
by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the
introduction of damaging evidence."" Thus, the Court adhered to
the principle that fourth amendment rights are personal rights not
to be asserted vicariously."
The Court recognized that its refusal to extend standing to a
co-conspirator, based solely upon his relationship to the party whose
rights had been infringed, limited the scope of the exclusionary
rule.47 A policy decision was made in favor of providing society with
relevant, probative evidence rather than minimally increasing the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule."
In part II of the Alderman opinion, however, the Court stated
that a homeowner, who also happened to be a co-conspirator, on
40. Id. at 376. The Mancusi standing inquiry could be viewed as limiting the Jones
"legitimately on [the] premises" test because it is conceivable that one legitimately in a
business office or other premise might lack the requisite reasonable expectation of privacy.
41. 394 U.S. 165 (1968).
42. Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 875(c) (1948). 394 U.S. at 167.
43. Id. at 167-68.
44. Id. at 171.
45. Id. at 171-72.
46. Id. at 174. But see Justice Harlan's separate opinion in which he argued that the
ruling of the Court actually permits some defendants to assert vicariously the personal rights
of others. Id. at 189, 194.
47. Id. at 174-75.
48. The majority stated: "We are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending
the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public
interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the
basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." Id. at 175.
[Vol. 34:99
AUTO PRIVACY
whose premises the alleged unlawful surveillance took place, had
standing to object to any conversation in which he participated or
any conversation occurring on his premises, whether or not he was
present, because such conversations were the fruit of an unauthor-
ized invasion of an area in which the homeowner had a right to
expect privacy. 9 In addition, any petitioner whose conversation had
been unlawfully overheard had standing to object to the use of that
conversation against him.50
Justice Harlan dissented on these points, being of the opinion
that standing should only be granted to those who had participated
in an unlawfully overheard conversation and not to a property owner
whose conversational privacy had not been infringed.5 He stated
that under traditional notions of standing, an "absent property
owner does not have a property interest of any sort in a conversation
in which he did not participate. 12 Thus, Justice Harlan believed
that the majority decision was based upon a forced misapplication
of the "fruits" theory.1
3
It seemed evident to Harlan that the area of conversational
privacy in standing law had to be reconsidered in the light of Katz
v. United States.5" Using a Katz analysis, third parties would rea-
sonably expect their conversations to remain private, even to the
extent of the owner of the premises where the conversation took
place. Therefore, even a property owner should not have standing
to assert an invasion of a third party's personal right to a private
conversation." Justice Harlan predicted that confusion in the lower
courts would result from the misleading rationale behind the prop-
erty rule established by the majority."
Justice Fortas, separately concurring and dissenting, supported
a "target theory" approach to standing under which any person
against whom an investigation is directed has standing to object to
the use of the illegally obtained material and its fruits. 7 He took the
49. Id. at 176.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 187, 189.
52. Id. at 190.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 191. In the field of conversational privacy "the Fourth Amendment protects
persons, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
55. 394 U.S. at 191-92. Justice Harlan's rationale for this holding is identical to the
majority reasoning used to deny standing to co-conspirators: to provide the public with
probative, relevant evidence for prosecution at the expense of a marginal extension of a
deterrent effect under the exclusionary rule. Id. at 193. See note 8 and accompanying text
supra.
56. Id. at 196.
57. Id. at 201. Justice Douglas agreed that the fourth amendment protects those against
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following words from Jones to support his proposition: "In order to
qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure,'
one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against
whom the search was directed. . .. ,,s1 Although his argument fell
on deaf ears, 9 Justice Fortas felt that this expansion 0 of standing
law would ensure the Court's integrity because the legality of the
means utilized by the state in investigating a "target" would be
properly probed through the defendant's motion to suppress.,
Jones, Simmons, Mancusi, and Alderman have long been rec-
ognized as the major enunciations of the guidelines of the Supreme
Court in fourth amendment standing cases. To this list, the land-
mark ruling in Rakas v. Illinois2 has now been added.
whom an investigation is directed. See id. at 187.
58. Id. at 207 (quoting 362 U.S. at 261) (emphasis added by Justice Fortas). Confusion
arises with regard to the interpretation of the phrase "one against whom the search was
directed." The petitioners would have it mean one whom the law enforcement agents intend
to use the evidence against, rather than one who actually suffers the intrusion of the search
and seizure by being the actual victim of the invasion of privacy. United States v. Cella, 568
F.2d 1266, 1282 (9th Cir. 1978).
59. While the majority ignored Justice Fortas' suggestion, Justice Harlan specifically
rejected it stating that a broader standing rule would only have had a marginal impact upon
police conduct. 394 U.S. at 188 n.1.
A few commentators have expressed an interest in this approach to standing. See White
& Greenspan, supra note 6, at 349, in which the authors propose a rule which would allow
standing to any one against whom the police sought to obtain evidence. Under this rule,
standing would not be based upon a fourth amendment right (since one cannot vicariously
assert the rights of another from whom the evidence was illegally obtained), but rather upon
the policy underlying the rule in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See note 1 and accompa-
nying text supra.
Compare this approach with another commentator's proposal that standing should be
granted whenever there is an arguable violation of the fourth amendment rights of the indi-
vidual challenging the search. Knox, supra note 7, at 2, 46-50.
60. The broadest approach to standing imaginable would afford standing to all defen-
dants. This total abolition of a standing rule has been suggested or analyzed in the following:
United States v. West, 453 F.2d 1351 (3d Cir. 1972); Rosencranz v. United States, 334 F.2d
738 (1st Cir. 1964) (Adrich, J., concurring); Binkiewicz v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 233,
237 (D. Mass. 1968); 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 608; Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367, 433 (1974); Comment, Standing to Object to
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 342 (1967). Abolishing standing
completely exacts a large price as it would require excluding all evidence resulting from an
illegal search, regardless of any deterrent effect. White & Greenspan, supra note 6, at 366.
61. 394 U.S. at 206. Fortas felt that a rule which denied standing to a defendant who
was the target of an investigation and allowed the admission of unlawfully obtained evidence,
legitimized the conduct which procured the evidence. Id. at 204 n.3, (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 13 n.2 (1968)).
62. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). The composition of the Court has changed dramatically in the
intervening decade; Justices Rehnquist, Powell, Blackmun, Brennan, Stevens and Chief
Justice Burger are "new" to the issue of fourth amendment standing.
[Vol. 34:99
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C. Rakas v. Illinois: The Dent in Traditional
Standing Concepts
1. THE MAJORITY OPINION
On December 5, 1978, in a five-to-four decision, the Supreme
Court affirmed a lower court conviction of two petitioners for armed
robbery in the case of Rakas v. Illinois.4 The facts of Rakas are
simple: a police officer on patrol was notified that a local clothing
store had been robbed. He spotted a dark Plymouth Roadrunner
believed to be the getaway car. He and several other officers, who
had been called for assistance, stopped the car and ordered the
occupants, two male petitioners and two female companions, out of
the car. A search revealed a box of rifle shells in the locked glove
compartment and a sawed off rifle under the front passenger seat. 5
A subsequent inquiry disclosed that one woman who had been driv-
ing the car prior to the search was the car's owner.
Prior to trial, two of the passengers, Frank L. Rakas and Lonnie
L. King,6 moved to suppress the seized evidence alleging a violation
of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. 7 They did not, however,
assert ownership of the seized rifle or shells."8 The trial court denied
the motion to suppress, holding that because the defendants had no
proprietary interest in either the rifle, the shells or the car, they
lacked standing to challenge the search." After the Supreme Court
63. Kilpatrick, Burger Court Turns the Table on Criminals, A 5-4 Ruling Re-Interprets
Fourth Amendment, Miami Herald, Dec. 16, 1978, § A, at 8, col. 1. The author of the
editorial, James Kilpatrick, claims the Court "struck a blow for common sense" and "[in
Earl Warren's time, it would have gone the other way." See also PLAYBoY, Apr. 1979, at 63.
64. 439 U.S. 128 (1978), aff'g People v. Rakas, 46 Ill. App. 3d 569, 360 N.E.2d 1252
(1977).
65. Id. at 130.
66. At the time of the robbery, Mr. Rakas was 28 and Mr. King, alias Douglas Clontz,
was 30. Both men had long criminal records. Kilpatrick, supra note 63.
67. 439 U.S. at 130.
68. Id. Petitioners claimed that they were never asked whether they owned the rifle or
shells. The Court rejected this argument stating that the burden of establishing the violations
of one's fourth amendment rights is upon the proponent in a motion to suppress. Id. n.1.
Had the defendants claimed ownership of the seized items, it appears that they would
have had standing to contest the search under the rationale of Simmons. In addition, their
admission of ownership could not have been used by the prosecution at trial. See notes 27-30
and accompanying text supra.
It is unclear why the defendants did not claim ownership. Either they were not the owners
or it was a strategic move made so that they could later deny ownership and not be subject
to impeachment by a pretrial admission.
69. 439 U.S. at 131. Thus, because it was determined that the petitioners lacked
standing, neither the lower courts nor the Supreme Court ever reached the issue of whether
there was probable cause for the search. Id.
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of Illinois refused to hear the petitioners' appeal,7" the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari7 "in light of the ob-
vious importance of the issues raised to the administration of crimi-
nal justice."7
In their attempt to establish standing, the defendants ad-
vanced a two-pronged argument based in part on the Court's deci-
sion in Jones v. United States.7 3 First, they asserted that the Court
should adopt the "target theory"7 under which anyone at whom a
search was "directed" would have standing to contest its legality.75
Alternatively, they argued that they had standing because, as pas-
sengers in the searched automobile, they were "legitimately on
[the] premises" at the time of the search.7"
Before discussing these claims, the Court foretold its departure
from traditional standing law:
[Wie are not at all sure that the determination of a motion to
suppress is materially aided by labeling the inquiry identified in
Jones as one of standing, rather than simply recognizing it as one
involving the substantive question of whether or not the propo-
nent of the motion to suppress has had his own Fourth Amend-
ment rights infringed by the search and seizure which he seeks
to challenge.77
With the tone thus set, it is hardly surprising that the Court
flatly rejected the "target theory." Even the dissent rejected this
theory,7" which now appears to be constitutionally foreclosed except
for possible state applications.7"
70. Id.
71. 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
72. 439 U.S. at 130.
73. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
74. See notes 57-61 and accompanying text supra.
75. 439 U.S. at 132. It is noteworthy that the Court mentions an aspect of traditional
standing doctrine which was not considered in Jones and which was unquestioned by the
Court. This is "the proposition that a party seeking relief must allege . . . a personal stake
or interest in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which Art.
HI requires." Id. at 424 n.2 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). See note 6 supra.
Thus, one not a defendant in a criminal action lacks standing even though his fourth
amendment rights may have been violated by an illegal search. In Rakas, therefore, the
owner-driver could not assert an objection to the search. Moreover, if he is never charged with
an offense emanating from the actions in the case, his only recourse is a civil action for
damages, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), or a state cause of action for invasion of privacy
or trespass. 439 U.S. at 134.
76. 439 U.S. at 132.
77. Id. at 133.
78. 439 U.S. at 156 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
79. See note 15 supra.
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After burying the "target theory,"8 the Court made a radical
departure from traditional standing law. Announcing its new ap-
proach, the Court stated: "[Tihe better analysis forthrightly fo-
cuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the
Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but
invariably intertwined concept of standing."'" Thus, substantive
fourth amendment doctrine, rather than the confusing issue of
standing, will now be the primary subject of the Court's inquiry. 2
As the Court implied, this is not an entirely novel approach. In
Katz, the Court also began its inquiry with an analysis of substan-
tive fourth amendment law to determine whether a person in a
telephone booth could rely on the protection of the fourth amend-
ment." Mancusi v. DeForte4 was held up as an example of the now
defunct standing analysis in which the Court focused on the issue
of standing without inquiring into the merits of the substantive
question." The Court then explicitly set forth the appropriate in-
quiry:
[Tihe question is whether the challenged search or seizure vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant who
seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it. That inquiry in
80. Three reasons were given for burying the target theory: (1) the two holdings in Jones
would have been superfluous since Jones had been the "target" of the search; (2) the reasons
advanced by Justice Harlan in Alderman, 394 U.S. 165, 188 n.1 (1969), wherein he said that
the target theory presents "very substantial administrative difficulties," and (3) such a broad
grant of standing "to raise vicarious fourth amendment claims would necessarily mean a more
widespread invocation of the exclusionary rule." 439 U.S. at 133-38.
In discussing the last of these reasons, the Court's dislike for the exclusionary rule
became apparent. Justice Rehnquist stated: "Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it
exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights. Relevant and
reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected."
Id. at 137. Thus it appears that the majority in this case deemed the societal cost of applying
the exclusionary rule in this situation, and allowing a "target" defendant standing, too
expensive. See also notes 141-44 and accompanying text infra.
81. 439 U.S. at 139. Justice Rehnquist cautioned, however, that nothing in Rakas
should be construed as casting any doubt on cases which view standing from two perspec-
tives; i.e. whether he is asserting his own legal rights rather than those of third parties. Id.
(citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499
(1975); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-
53 (1970)).
At least one commentator proposes that fourth amendment standing cases should be
harmonized with the rules governing standing which are needed to raise other constitutional
issues. See Knox, supra note 8, at 30-35.
82. 439 U.S. at 140. The majority asserts that the inquiry under either approach is the
same.
83. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1968).
84. 392 U.S. 364 (1968). For a discussion of Mancusi, see notes 32-34, and accompanying
text supra.
85. 439 U.S. at 139 n.7.
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turn requires a determination of whether the disputed search and
seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect."
With these few words, the "rubric of standing"87 has been swept
away. The tests, analyses and philosophical underpinnings em-
ployed in prior standing cases, while still relevant, are now subject
to reformulation. Past standing cases now stand on shaky ground as
the Court shifts its focus to a substantive fourth amendment analy-
sis of the merits rather than a methodical application of standing
tests.
Having first rephrased the inquiry, the majority next launched
an attack on the time honored "legitimately on [the] premises"
test of Jones.8 The petitioners in Rakas argued that, as passengers
in the searched automobile, they had standing to contest the valid-
ity of the search because like Jones in his friend's apartment, they
were legitimately on the premises when their fourth amendment
rights were violated.
Under the light of the new inquiry, Justice Rehnquist reexam-
ined Jones and found that the respondent there had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the apartment and could thus claim the
protection afforded by the fourth amendment." According to Jus-
tice Rehnquist, Jones now stands for "the unremarkable proposition
that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place other
than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him
from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place." 0
86. Id. at 140.
87. Id.
88. The Court noted that with few exceptions the lower courts have literally applied the
holding of Jones. Id. at 142 n.10. See, e.g., United States v. Medina-Flores, 477 F.2d 225,
228 (10th Cir. 1973) (passenger had standing to object to warrantless search of carryall since
he was a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of FED. R. CraM. P. 41(e)); United States v.
Peisner, 311 F.2d 94, 105 (4th Cir. 1962) (defendant never claimed an interest in seized
contraband but as a passenger he was lawfully in the car when the seizure was made and
could move for suppression); United States v. Harris, 5 M.J. 44, 46 (C.M.A. 1978) (standing
for passenger who was legitimately present at the scene of the search); cf. Harper v. State,
84 Nev. 233, 236-39, 440 P.2d 893, 895-97 (1968) (passenger had no standing to contest search
where driver alleging ownership gave permission to search).
Most courts agree that an occupant of a vehicle cannot have standing merely by virtue
of his presence if he possesses a stolen vehicle. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 11.3(e) at
573 and cases cited therein. But see, Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385, 391 (9th Cir. 1967)
(thief had standing in stolen car because he asserted a paramount possessory interest); and
Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291, 294 (10th Cir. 1965) (defendant who claimed posses-
sory interest in automobile had standing despite lack of ownership).
89. 439 U.S. at 143.
90. Id. at 142 (citations omitted). Jones, Marcusi, and United States v. Jeffers, 342
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Instead of the "legitimately on [the] premises" test, the Court
wishes us to turn to Katz for guidance. Thus, the bottom line in-
quiry appears to be "whether the person who claims the protection
of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place."'" To determine whether an expectation of privacy
is legitimate or not, the majority would employ concepts of real or
personal property law and understandings which are recognized and
permitted by society. 2 Thus, although one's legitimate presence on
the premises may now be considered, it is not a controlling factor 3
in determining whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists.
Moving next to the facts of Rakas, the Court reiterated that the
defendants had asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest
in either the car or the items seized, nor had they shown any expec-
tation of privacy in the glove compartment or the area under the
seat. 4 As support for the proposition that a passenger has no expec-
tation of privacy in these areas, the Court analogized those places
to the trunk of a car submitting that mere passengers cannot legiti-
mately expect any privacy in the trunk of another's car.' 5 Absent
any showing by the petitioners of an expectation of privacy in the
areas searched, they were foreclosed from contesting the validity of
the search and the admissibility of the items seized.
2. THE CONCURRING OPINION
Unlike his brethren on the majority, Justice Powell, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, felt that the narrow issue before the Court
U.S. 48 (1951) all recognized that one may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in prem-
ises that one does not own or rent. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
91. 439 U.S. at 143.
92. Id. The Court noted that one of the principal rights attaching to property is the right
to exclude all others.
93. Justice Rehnquist recognized that Katz rejected basing expectations of privacy on
common law property concepts. He noted, however, that the Court has never altogether
abandoned the use of property concepts in determining whether a privacy interest is protected
by the fourth amendment, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12 (citing Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969) for the proposition that one's property interest in his own home allowed a
defendant to object to conversations occurring there even though he himself was not present).
See notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra.
The Supreme Court has often defined standing in terms of property concepts by holding
that standing may be established by a "proprietary or possessory interest in the premises,"
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973), or by having a "property interest" in the
items seized. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note
37, § 11.3 at 544. The dissenting Justices took the majority to task for its reference to property
concepts. See notes 199-200 and accompanying text infra.
94. 439 U.S. at 148.
95. Id. Jones' "legitimately on [the] premises" test is limited to the facts of that case.
Id. at 143.
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was: "Did the search of [the petitioners'] friend's automobile after
they had left it violate any Fourth Amendment right of the
petitioners?"" The ultimate inquiry thus becomes "[Wihether
one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in
light of all the surrounding circumstances?"' 7
Having thus rephrased the inquiry, Justice Powell listed a few
of the multitude of factors which will be considered to determine if
one has a reasonable claim to privacy: (1) what precautions one took
to maintain privacy;" (2) how one utilizes a premise;" (3) historical
factors;IN and, (4) property rights. 0' While Justice Powell conceded
that his test provides little or no guidance for law enforcement offi-
cials, he maintained that it is faithful to the principles of the fourth
amendment."'2
Instead of looking at the facts of the instant case, however,
Justice Powell relied heavily upon the historical treatment given to
automobile searches, concluding that, "[n]othing is better
established in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence than the distinc-
tion between one's expectation of privacy in an automobile and
one's expectation when in other locations."'0 3 After engaging in a
myopic inquiry which determined merely that the passengers had
no control over the car or its keys, Justice Powell boldly stated:
"[Ilt is unrealistic-as the shared experience of us all bears wit-
ness-to suggest that these passengers had any reasonable expecta-
96. Id. at 151.
97. Id. at 152. This is a different phrasing than the majority used for its new inquiry.
See notes 96 and 102 and accompanying text supra. At first glance there appears to be no
substantive difference in application. Justice Powell's approach may be more fluid and un-
predictable in that emphasis is placed on "the surrounding circumstances" which will change
with the fact pattern in each case.
98. Id. (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (defendants locked
effects in a footlocker thus manifesting an expectation that the contents would remain free
from public examination); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (defendant who
shut the door of a phone booth expected that his words would not be heard by others). The
petitioners in Rakas shut the doors of the car. Should it make a difference if they locked the
car doors or if one of them was the one to lock the glove compartment? According to Justice
Powell, if it was shown that any of the petitioners had possessed the keys to lock the glove,
compartment, or if a rifle had not been found, then a "closer case" might have resulted. In
addition, because the petitioners had no fourth amendment right to resist a police order to
vacate the car following a proper stop, the closing of a door did not have the same significance
as it might have had in other contexts. 439 U.S. at 155 n.4.




103. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added).
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tion that the car in which they had been riding would not be
searched after they were lawfully stopped and made to get out.''0
3. THE DISSENTING OPINION
In a spirited opinion, the four dissenting justices, led by
Justice White,'0 5 challenged the majority on a number of points.
First, they observed that the majority had eroded two fundamental
principles of fourth amendment law: (1) that there is at least some
expectation of privacy in the interior of an automobile' 6 and
(2) that persons "legitimately on [the] premises" have standing to
contest a search.'10 Second, the Court had in the past assumed that
passengers were entitled to protection against unreasonable
searches occurring in their presence." s This assumption had always
appeared reasonable because, under the Jones test, all private
premises would seem to be treated similarly for standing purposes.'0
Third, the dissenters criticized the majority opinion for hinging
expectations of privacy on ownership and property concepts which
had been buried by Katz and Jones."o According to Justice White,
the relevant inquiry, taken from Mancusi, should be "whether peti-
tioner had an interest in connection with the searched premises that
gave rise to a 'reasonable expectation [on his part] of freedom from
104. Id. at 155. Perhaps Justice Powell should have been more concerned with the
underlying facts of Rakas. He noted that varying factors can change the outcome of the
case, yet blandly stated that because the facts of the instant case were not comparable to
those in Jones, Katz, and Chadwick, the petitioners' "minimal" expectations of privacy were
not reasonable.
105. Joining Justice White were Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens.
106. 439 U.S. at 157 (citing Chadwick). The Court in Chadwick declared that, "[a)
search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy." 433 U.S. at 12-13.
107. The dissent was apparently shocked at the evisceration of the Jones principal so
soon after the unanimous opinion authored by the Chief Justice which supported the princi-
pal in Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 227 n.2 (1973). 439 U.S. at 158.
108. 439 U.S. at 158-59. The dissent also noted decisions in which the petitioner was not
the owner of the auto yet the case was heard on its merits. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See also note 98 supra.
109. 439 U.S. at 159.
110. Id. at 162. The Court in Katz stated that "[tihe premise that property interests
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited," 389 U.S. at
353 (1967) (citations omitted).
The dissent claims the Court is returning to the notion that only trespass on property
rights will violate the fourth amendment. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466
(1928).
By linking privacy protections to outmoded concepts of possession, title or ownership,
fourth amendment protections are limited to only those affluent enough to buy or obtain
possession to gain their zone of privacy. 439 U.S. at 166.
See Justice Harlan's criticism of the utilization of property concepts in Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 191 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) and note 62 supra.
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governmental intrusion' upon the premises.""'
To answer what it believed to be the proper inquiry, the dissent
analyzed the facts in the light of Katz and found the majority's
conclusion to be inconsistent. According to the dissent, Katz had
recognized that an individual in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, in a taxicab, or in a phone booth may rely on the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment." 2 It thus seems logical that a person
riding in a private automobile with the permission of the owner is
entitled to the same protection." 3
At a minimum, the dissent expressed the fear that the police
will have no idea who has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
automobiles." ' At worst, the dissent worried that the majority had
declared "'open season' on automobiles.""' 5 Because only the
owner of the vehicle or the seized item can object to a search, police
have nothing to lose by searching a car with more than one occupant
in hopes that an illegal search will yield evidence against a mere
passenger who cannot object."'
4. ANALYSIS
The philosophical basis for the Rakas opinion was foresha-
dowed in earlier cases so the decision should not have come as a
complete shock."7 For example, in Mancusi the inquiry was whether
DeForte's office was an area "in which there was a reasonable expec-
tation of freedom from governmental intrusion.""' This is very simi-
111. 439 U.S. at 161 (quoting Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968)).
112. 389 U.S. at 352 (footnotes omitted).
113. The dissent stated "a person legitimately on private premises knows the others
allowed there and, though his privacy is not absolute, is entitled to expect that he is sharing
it only with those persons and that governmental officials will intrude only with consent or
by complying with the Fourth Amendment." 439 U.S. at 164. (citations omitted).
114. The prior "legitimately on [the] premises" test had provided a "bright line" by
which the police could distinguish between the protected and the unprotected. Id. at 168.
This easily adopted test provided for predictability, ease of enforcements, and limited police
discretion. The majority, however, criticized Justice White's "bright line" test as being un-
workable. See id. at 145-46 n.13.
115. 439 U.S. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 168-69. The Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), warned that "[a]
ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, . . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing the
conduct which produced the evidence .... " Id. at 13.
If a policeman has no firm guidelines defining legal searches, he may either indulge in
undesirable conduct or refrain from that which is desirable. See generally Blakey, The Rule
of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U.
PA. L. REv. 499, 552 n.379 (1964).
117. Commentators have also framed similar inquiries as those advanced in Rakas. See
Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 20, at 450; 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 37, § 11.3 at 570.




lar to the Court's new substantive fourth amendment inquiry. In
Alderman, Jusice Harlan wanted the majority to reinterpret stand-
ing according to substantive fourth amendment principles rather
than property concepts."' It is probable that the effect of the Rakas
opinion will be to relegate prior standing principles to noncontroll-
ing factors in the Court's inquiry as to whether there is a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched.
The majority's characterization of the new inquiry in terms of
fourth amendment substantive questions rather than ancient stand-
ing concepts has considerable merit. The new test represents a bal-
ancing of the desire of people to be left alone against necessary
limitations on that desire due to the needs of a free society.2 0 It is
obvious, however, that this new inquiry presents an ad hoc ap-
proach. Each individual fact must now be examined to determine
whether one's expectation of privacy has been invaded. Only when
this threshold inquiry has been answered affirmatively, may one
contest the validity of a search and seizure. The issue of probable
cause then comes into play with its own ad hoc facts and circum-
stances approach. With no "bright line" standing tests to apply to
various facts, extensive litigation is inevitable.
Although the Court's new inquiry has merit, its application in
Rakas and the Court's recommendations as to its use in automobile
search cases are questionable. The remainder of this article will deal
with the major criticisms of the Rakas decision.
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. The Rule in Rakas
By denying standing to automobile passengers who possess no
proprietary interest in the automobile in which they ride or in the
items seized, the Court in Rakas has drawn precious blood from an
already ailing exclusionary rule.
2'
The Rakas opinion uses the standing doctrine to reduce the
importance of the exclusionary rule, but does so without analyti-
119. 394 U.S. at 191 (1969). See also note 54 supra.
120. See notes 188-212 and accompanying text infra. In the aftermath of Rakas, one court
stated that it was not clear from Rakas whether the automatic standing rule of Jones was
eliminated in cases where there is prosecutorial self-contradiction. United States v. Ochs, No.
78-1163, slip op. at 1659 n.4 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 1979). For a case of prosecutorial contradictory
positions in an auto search, see Glisson v. United States, 406 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1969).
120. See Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 20, at 450.
121. For an excellent discussion of Supreme Court cases which have undermined the
exclusionary rule, see Comment, Exclusionary Rule under Attack, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 89
(1974).
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cally addressing the benefits and shortcomings of the rule. The only
references to the exclusionary rule in Justice Rehnquist's opinion
clearly show the Court's awareness that its decision narrows the
applicability of the rule.
Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial
social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights ...
Since our cases generally have held that one whose Fourth
Amendment rights are violated may successfully suppress evi-
dence obtained in the course of an illegal search and seizure,
misgivings as to the benefit of enlarging the class of persons who
may invoke that rule are properly considered when deciding
whether to expand standing to assert Fourth Amendment viola-
tions. "'
Although the Court asserted that problems with the exclusionary
rule are properly considered when deciding an issue of standing, it
never addressed those problems or the merits of the rule. As the
dissenters recognized, 2 ' if the Court was troubled by the practical
impact of the exclusionary rule, it should have squarely faced the
issue of the rule's continued validity rather than manipulating the
standing doctrine to reach a desired result in the specific case."'
B. History and Purpose
Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment was
first excluded by the Supreme Court in the 1886 case of Boyd v.
United States. 5 The evidence excluded in Boyd was obtained under
a revenue statute which authorized the courts to require the defen-
dant to produce his private records. The Court based its exclusion
of such evidence upon both the fourth and fifth amendments, com-
menting that requiring the compulsory production of private records
is tantamount to an unreasonable search and seizure.
26
The first Supreme Court case to base the exclusionary rule
solely upon the fourth amendment was Weeks v. United States, 
2
122. 439 U.S. at 137-38 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted that "since the ex-
clusion rule is an attempt to effectuate the guaranties of the Fourth Amendment . . . , it is
proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to
benefit from the rule's protections." Id. at 134 (citation and footnote omitted).
123. Id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
124. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536-42 (White, J., dissenting) ("I would join...
in substantially limiting the reach of the exclusionary rule ... .
125. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
126. Id. at 634-35.




decided in 1914. In a unanimous decision, the Court commented
that "[if letters and private documents can . . .be seized and
held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be
secure against such searches and seizures is of no value . . . .
Six years after Weeks, the Court, in Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. United States, 'I adopted what has come to be known as the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine.34 Analogizing illegally obtained evi-
dence to a poisonous tree, the Court held that not only should the
evidence obtained in the illegal search be excluded from court, but
that the "fruits" of that "tree"-other evidence which would not
have been found without the aid of the initial illegal search-should
also be excluded.'
31
The fourth amendment provides that the people shall be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures; 32 however, it does not
explicitly delineate the consequences for violation of this guarantee.
The Weeks Court resolved the resulting confusion, reasoning that if
a court could not sanction a legally deficient search or seizure before
a government official acts,'1 then it should not possess the ability
to sanction the search or seizure after it has occurred. 3' As the Court
noted:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws ...to
obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . . should find
no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at
all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people
128. Id. at 393.
129. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
130. The phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" was first used in Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
131. 251 U.S. at 392. The Nardone decision, however, established the "independent
source" and the "attenuation" exceptions to the doctrine. Under the former, evidence ob-
tained independently of the tainted evidence is not fruit of the poisonous tree. Under the
attenuation exception, the prosecution can prove that the connection between the initial
illegally obtained evidence and the derived evidence is "so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint." Id. at 341. See generally Bain & Kelly, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Recent Develop-
ments as Viewed Through its Exceptions, 31 U. Mu.MI L. REV. 615, (1977); Pitler, "The Fruit
of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 579 (1968).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
133. The courts, for example, must first determine that there is sufficient cause for a
search warrant to issue.
134. See Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 34; Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 11, 25 (1925); Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule
an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment? 62 JUDICATuRE 67, 68
(1978).
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of all conditions have a right to appeal for maintenance of such
fundamental rights."'
The Court concluded that to sanction such proceedings would be to
affirm judicially a "manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the
prohibitions of the Constitution . . . ."I" Thus, at its inception, the
purpose of the exclusionary rule was to insure that the judiciary
would enforce the mandate of the fourth amendment and minimize
the courts' departure from their role as defenders of the Constitu-
tion. ,37
As exclusion cases became more common, the Court began to
recognize that enforcement of the rule appeared to deter illegal po-
lice conduct. This apparent side effect was elevated to a "purpose"
in Elkins v. United States'5 in which the Court stated that "[tihe
rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."'' The
decision went on to say that "there is another consideration-the
imperative of judicial integrity,"" but the primary rationale behind
the opinion was clearly deterrence."' In Mapp v. Ohio,"' the Su-
preme Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule is an essential part
of the fourth amendment and applied the rule to the states through
the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The Court justified
its action finding that the purposes of the exclusionary rule are to
protect judicial integrity," 3 and to provide a deterrent effect upon
law enforcement officials."' Indeed, the Court stated that the exclu-
sionary rule is the only effective method to compel respect for the
fourth amendment."45
Four years after Mapp, in Linkletter v. Walker,"' the Court
stated that the controlling purpose of the exclusionary rule is "to
135. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
136. Id. at 394.
137. For a more detailed examination of the exclusionary rule, see Sunderland, The
Exclusionary Rule: A Requirement of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CrIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
141 (1978).
138. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
139. Id. at 217.
140. Id. at 222.
141. Less than one page of the nineteen page opinion discusses the judicial integrity
purpose, and even then it is described only as "another consideration." Id.
142. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
143. Id. at 659 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960)).
144. Id. at 656.
145. Id. (citing 346 U.S. at 207). The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule removes
the incentive to disregard privacy rights.
146. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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deter the lawless action of the police" 147 and that this purpose would
not be served by "the wholesale release of the guilty victims." The
shift from judicial integrity to deterrence as the primary purpose
behind the rule was completed in United States v. Calandra,148 a
1974 decision in which the Court noted that the exclusionary rule
"is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.""4 It is
apparent that judicial integrity is no longer recognized as the prime
purpose behind the exclusionary rule; the deterrent effect of the rule
has become the driving force behind its existence.
C. Viability of the Rule
Critics of the exclusionary rule point to empirical studies which
challenge the deterrent effect of the rule'w and also note that the
rule applies after the search or seizure has occurred. 15'
From a public relations point of view, [the exclusionary rule] is
the worst possible kind of rule because it only works at the behest
of a person, usually someone who is clearly guilty, who is at-
tempting to prevent the use against himself of evidence of his own
crimes.
[Ilt works after the fact, so that by then we know who
the criminal is, the evidence against him, and the other circum-
stances of the case.152
Subsequent research has raised questions regarding the validity of
these empirical studies, however. Although the earlier surveys sug-
147. Id. at 637. The issue in Linkletter was whether Mapp should be applied retroac-
tively. The Court found that "the wholesale release of the guilty victims" of past illegal
searches would do nothing to deter future illegal police actions. Id.
148. 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Calandra held that a grand jury witness may not refuse to
answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained from him in an
earlier unlawful search.
149. Id. at 348.
150. E.g. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L.
REv. 665 (1970). See also Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusion-
ary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 245-48 (1973).
151. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), in which the Court noted,
"[t]hat the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty persons is more
capable of demonstration than that is deters invasions of right by the police." Id. at 136
(1954).
152. J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 215-16 (2d ed. 1978). For other criticism of the exclu-
sionary rule, see Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974);
McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. CRIM L.
CRIMINOLOGY & Police Sci. 266 (1961); Wilkey, Why Suppress Valid Evidence? 13 PaosEcUroa
124 (1977).
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gested little relationship between the exclusionary rule and its de-
terrent effect on police behavior,'53 other investigations reveal a
marked relationship between adoption of the rule and a reduction
in the amount of unconstitutional police behavior.'54 The authors of
the more recent studies give added weight to the deterrent justifica-
tion for the rule. 55
Critics who object to the exclusionary rule because it takes
effect after the unconstitutional search or seizure'" have lost sight
of the original purpose of the rule recognized in Weeks. 57 Judicial
integrity demands that the efforts of the courts and their officers to
bring the guilty to punishment should not be aided by the sacrifice
of principles deeply embodied in our fundamental law.'15
If it is true, as Cooley said of the Fourth Amendment 110
years ago, that "it is better oftentimes that crime should go un-
punished than that a citizen should be liable to have his premises
invaded, his trunks broken up, [or] his private books, papers,
and letters exposed to prying curiosity," why is it no less true
when the accused's premises have been invaded or his constitu-
tional rights otherwise violated? If the government could not have
gained a conviction had it obeyed the Constitution, why should
it be permitted to prevail because it has violated the
Constitution?'5
Failure to exclude evidence seized in violation of the fourth amend-
ment merely because the unlawful search and seizure has already
occurred would give judicial affirmation to police defiance of the
Constitution.
The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment is not dependent upon the severity of that intrusion or
the good faith of the officer involved in the initial search and sei-
zure. Under the American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-
153. See note 166 supra.
154. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea
Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Critique, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 740
(1974).
155. It is interesting to note that while some critics of the rule are urging its modification
or elimination on the ground that it has had little effect on police behavior, other critics are
calling for the rule's repeal or modification on the ground that the police have attained such
a high level of compliance with the fourth amendment guaranties that the rule is no longer
needed as a deterrent. See Kamisar, A Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 15 CalM. L. BULL.
5, 13 (1979).
156. See note 168 supra.
157. See text accompanying notes 153-57 supra.
158. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
159. Kamisar, supra note 155, at 13 (1979) (emphasis and brackets in original) (quoting
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTrrTrIONAL LIMrrATIONS 306 (lst ed. Boston 1868)).
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Arraignment Procedure,'" however, a motion to suppress evidence
will be granted only if the court finds that the violation upon which
it is based was "substantial," or otherwise required by the Constitu-
tion. The Code adds that a violation will be deemed substantial
if it was willful, regardless of any good faith on the part of the police
officer involved.," Among those criteria used to determine the sub-
stantiality of a violation are: the extent of deviation from lawful
conduct, and the extent to which privacy was invaded."3
Other proposals would limit the applicability of the exclusion-
ary rule in situations where police good faith is present,"' or would
replace the rule with a tort action against the offending police officer
or his employer."'6 All of these proposals are aimed at insuring that
criminals do not go free as a result of "incidental" search and sei-
zure violations. Yet with all these alternatives to the exclusionary
rule, the fact remains that the government will continue to obtain
convictions on the basis of unconstitutional police misconduct un-
less illegally obtained evidence is suppressed. Any "after the fact"
remedy fails to recognize that any "violation," whether substantial
or not, is by definition offensive to the privacy and property guaran-
tees of the fourth amendment. If the integrity of the Constitution is
to remain, any violation of its terms, regardless of how it is labeled,
must be condemned by the Court. The government should not be
judicially encouraged to pursue unconstitutional methods and con-
duct. It may also be argued that a private tort action is of little use
to a convict whose constitutional rights have been violated by an
illegal search or seizure.16
D. Conclusion
The Rakas opinion uses the standing doctrine to limit the scope
of the exclusionary rule without addressing whether such a limita-
160. ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975).
161. Id. § 290.2(2). For examples of fourth amendment violations which some critics
might deem nonsubstantial, see Boker & Corrigan, Making the Constable Culpable: A Pro-
posal to Improve the Exclusionary Rule, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1297-98 (1976); Sunderland,
supra note 137, at 153-55 (1978).
162. ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 290.2(3) (1975).
163. Id. § 290.2(4).
164. E.g. Weber, Good Faith of Peace Officers in Search and Seizure: Seeking Proper
Limits to the Exclusionary Rule, 53 L.A.B.J. 307 (1977).
165. E.g. Oaks, supra note 150 at 756-57; Schad, Police Liability for Invasion of Privacy,
16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 428 (1967).
166. One problem with the tort remedy is its viability in a jury trial. Certainly an accused
or convicted criminal will be prejudiced before a jury in his attempts to recover damages from
the police officer or government entity responsible for his capture and prosecution.
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tion is consistent with the purposes of the rule." 7 By couching its
opinion in the standing doctrine and creating a "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy" test which revolves around property concepts,' the
Court has, in effect, reduced the substantive fourth amendment
rights of the accused. A standing limitation based upon unrealistic
notions of possessory interest rather than real-to-life privacy expec-
tations' is inconsistent with the purposes behind the exclusionary
rule.
The Rakas majority has minimized the impact of the exclusion-
ary rule without providing any substantive justification or alterna-
tive privacy protection. Furthermore, by relying upon the standing
doctrine to restrict the rule, the Court has declared "open season on
automobile passengers''10 because passengers will lack the oppor-
tunity to assert that their fourth amendment rights have been vio-
lated.
Further, the Rakas approach fails to articulate factors, other
than property interests, which will establish a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. By creating this void, the Supreme Court has left
the lower courts and the police with wide discretion, and perhaps
confusion, in performing their responsibilities. Even if a possessory
interest is to be the sole factor for determining the existence of an
expectation of privacy, it remains uncertain whether notions of eq-
uitable title or constructive ownership may also provide a defendant
with a legitimate expectation of privacy in an automobile or in its
contents.
IV. THE IMPACT OF Rakas
Prior to Rakas, there was a presumption that a mere passenger
in an automobile was entitled to fourth amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted in his pres-
ence.' As a result of the Rakas opinions, however, passengers have
167. See notes 121-24 and accompanying text supra.
168. See notes 171-218 and accompanying text infra.
169. See note 172 infra.
170. 439 U.S. at 157 (White, J., dissenting) ("Insofar as passengers are concerned, the
Court's opinion today declares an 'open season' on automobiles."); see notes 187-88 infra and
accompanying text.
171. On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has reached the merits in cases ques-
tioning the validity of automobile searches even though the petitioners did not own or possess
the vehicle in question. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931). This pre-
sumption permeated the lower courts as well. In United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 892,
(1978) (en banc), for example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that lawful
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been stripped of any fourth amendment rights unless they can show
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or the items
seized. In order to show such an expectation, a defendant must now
rely upon property concepts. In his dissent, Justice White raised
some interesting questions regarding the future application of these
concepts:
If the nonowner were the spouse or child of the owner, would the
Court recognize a sufficient interest? If so, would distant relatives
somehow have more of an expectation of privacy than close
friends? What if the nonowner were driving with the owner's
permission? Would nonowning drivers have more of an expecta-
tion of privacy than mere passengers? What about a passenger in
a taxicab? Katz expressly recognized protection for such passen-
gers. Why should Fourth Amendment rights be present when one
pays a cabdriver for a ride but be absent when one is given a ride
by a friend?'
Since the Rakas decision, lower courts have been wrestling with
precisely these questions.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York was
given the opportunity to answer Justice White's question concerning
the standing of a nonowner spouse in United States v. Rivera. '73
While the court denied standing to a mere passenger in the car,"' it
addressed the merits of a motion to suppress which had been filed
by another passenger-the husband of the owner of the searched
automobile.'75 Another form of constructive possessory interest was
presence in a vehicle at. the time of a stop for the purpose of effecting a search is sufficient to
confer that reasonable expectation of privacy essential to a claim of standing. This assump-
tion has since been reversed by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210
(5th Cir. 1979) (citing Rakas). See also Bustamonte v. Schenckloth, 448 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1971), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th
Cir. 1963).
172. 439 U.S. at 167 (White, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). The majority, it should
be noted, raises questions about White's "bright line" test. Id. at 144-48. For the authors'
proposed'solution, see notes 289-90 and accompanying text infra.
173. 465 F. Supp. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
174. The court stated:
[Ilt is apparent that Rivera lacks standing to attack the seizure. It was estab-
lished in the course of the hearings that the 1970 green station wagon belonged
to one Ada Ramirez-wife of Maximino Ramirez. Rivera has failed to demon-
strate that he had any proprietary interest either in the car or the items seized.
Accordingly, he lacks* a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and the
goods seized therein and is without standing to challenge the seizure.
465 F. Supp. at 411.
175. Id. While the court reached the merits, it refused to suppress the evidence on other
grounds.
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demonstrated in United States v. Ochs."' In that case, petitioner,
Ochs, asserted no actual posessory interest in the car he had been
driving or in a briefcase which had been seized during a search of
that car. The record indicated, however, that the record owner of the
car was heavily indebted to the petitioner and had given the peti-
tioner a key to the automobile and the privilege of using the car
whenever he wished."' The record further disclosed that the peti-
tioner had possession of the car ninety percent of the time.7 ' The
Second Circuit allowed standing, citing Rakas, having found that
the petitioner had "complete dominion and control" over the car
with respect to all except its owner and thus "had standing because
of his possessory interest in the automobile . ... "I
Assuming that other circuits follow the Ochs "dominion and
control" test, it appears likely that drivers of borrowed automobiles
may possess the requisite possessory interest to assert a legitimate
expectation of privacy. If, however, an individual who has dominion
and control of an automobile as to everyone except the owner also
has a legitimate expectation of privacy in that automobile, it seems
illogical to say that a passenger in the same car whose dominion is
only subordinated to the owner and the driver, does not have a
similar expectation of privacy.
Although no other cases involving automobiles have been de-
cided, several quasi-possessory interests have been subjected to the
Rakas analysis in cases dealing with drug-laden ships and airplanes.
These cases may provide some guidance in determining the exist-
ence of a legitimate expectation of privacy in automobiles. The Fifth
Circuit has determined that the captain of a ship "could perhaps
assert sufficient protectable interests [and that] at least some of
those aboard vessels may reasonably expect a degree of privacy."' 1
Whatever degree of privacy a crewmember of a ship may have,
however, it does not extend to every portion of the ship. In United
States v. Williams, "I for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a
crewmember "has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the hold
of a merchant vessel,"'82 but the decision implied that he may have
such an expectation in the living quarters of the ship. A federal
district court in Maine has refused to indulge in such distinctions
176. 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir. 1979).
177. Id. at 1252-53.
178. Id. at 1252 n.3.
179. Id. at 1253 n.4.
180. United States v. Whitaker, 592 F.2d 827, 828 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979).
181. 589 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1979).
182. Id. at 214.
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when it was faced with similar circumstances, preferring to allow
standing to all the defendants who were on board the ship in ques-
tion: the owner, the captain and a crewmember.'3
In United States v. Bruneau, I a pilot whose argument regard-
ing his partial possessory interest was found to be "incredulous" by
the Eighth Circuit was denied standing to contest the search of the
aircraft he was allegedly flying. The defendant claimed that he gave
another man $10,000 to help purchase the airplane. While he was
able to show that he had indeed procured a $10,000 loan from his
bank, he could not substantiate that the money was actually used
to purchase the aircraft. 'u The court gave no indication whether the
defendant would have had standing if he had proven his case.
It is readily apparent that the Court's vague "notions of prop-
erty law" guidelines are subject to considerable interpretation and
that such guidelines are not always consistent with commonly ac-
cepted expectations of privacy. The Rakas opinion has made indi-
viduals' expectations of privacy contingent upon subtle distinctions
"whose validity is largely historical."'' 6 Of far more concern than the
lack of appropriate and clear guidelines for defendants, is the
Court's open invitation to police to engage in unreasonable searches
and seizures whenever an automobile contains more than one occu-
pant."a7 Police are now fully aware that even without a warrant or
probable cause, they may search an automobile containing two or
more occupants, sacrificing the privacy rights of the owner in order
to obtain evidence against mere passengers.'8
V. THE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN VEHICLES
The inquiry of the Supreme Court in Rakas focused on whether
the defendants "had a legitimate expectation of privacy" in particu-
lar areas of the automobile searched.' 8' This section discusses the
history and development of legitimate expectations of privacy in a
motor vehicle.
The fourth amendment protects "persons, houses, papers and
183. United States v. Hilton, 469 F. Supp. 94, 106 (N.D. Me. 1979). The cases which have
considered post-Rakas standing to contest searches of vessels are succinctly discussed in
United States v. Whitmore, 595 F.2d 1303, 1312 (5th Cir. 1979).
184. 594 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1979).
185. Id. at 1192-93.
186. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 266.
187. See 439 U.S. at 168-69.
188. See id. at 169 (citing Ingber, Procedure, Ceremony and Rhetoric: The Minimization
of Ideological Conflict in Deviance Control, 56 B.U. L. REV. 266, 304-05 (1976)).
189. 439 U.S. at 148.
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effects" from unreasonable searches."' The automobile comes
within the broad category of one's effects and thus gains the protec-
tion afforded by the fourth amendment. These protections, how-
ever, do not extend equally to one's person, home, papers or effects.
The leading automobile privacy case is Carroll v. United States,"'
which arose during the days of prohibition when moonshiners were
utilizing cars to peddle their wares. In this landmark case, agents
acting with probable cause conducted a warrantless search of de-
fendant's car and seized goods in transit."2 The Supreme Court
upheld the "reasonableness" of this warrantless search and created
an important exception to the warrant requirement based on the
mobility of the object or premises searched."' It would not have
been feasible for the agents to have procured a warrant before stop-
ping the car to search it. For determining reasonableness, the war-
rantless search of a vehicle which can quickly be moved from the
jurisdiction in which the warrant must issue is distinguishable from
the warrantless search of an immovable structure."'
190. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Bocigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the
Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 529, 532 n.20 (1978), for an interest-
ing tracing of the fourth amendment's history to the Magna Carta, Roman law and the Bible.
191. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
192. Of course, the probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment still remains.
One commentator has suggested that probable cause for auto searches is less certain today
than it was 50 years ago when Carroll was decided. See 53 N.C.L. REV. 722, 747 (1975).
193. Other types of exigent circumstances calling for an exception to the fourth amend-
ment warrant requirement are: (1) plain view, Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); (2) search
incident to lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); (3) stop and frisk, Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); (4) abandonment, United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir.
1973) (en banc); and (5) hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); see Carlton v.
Estelle, 490 F.2d 759, 761 (1973), cert. denied 414 U.S. 1043 (1973) (potential intervention
by third party is an exigent circumstance).
It has been over 50 years since Carroll was decided and the case is generally cited for
the proposition that "a car may be searched or seized without a warrant if there are both
exigent circumstances and probable cause to believe that the car will yield contraband or
evidence useful for prosecution of crime. . . ." Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835, 835 (1974).
Carroll specifically dealt with the provisions of the National Prohibition Act (the Vol-
stead Act) which is of little importance in present day fourth amendment doctrine. For an
interesting history of the car search doctrine and how it owes its birth to this Act, see Miles
& Wefing, The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled Relationship, 4
SETON HALL L. REV. 105, 112 (1972).
194. 267 U.S. at 153. The general rule respecting homes was well expressed by the words
of Lord Pitt:
The poorest man in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may
enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his force
dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
Quoted in N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FouRT AMENDMENT TO THE
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The Carroll doctrine was extended by Chambers v. Maroney. 5
The majority opinion by Justice White stated that there was no
difference for fourth amendment purposes between the immediate
search of an automobile without a warrant, and the immobilization
of a car until a warrant is obtained."' Chambers permits a search
to take place either at the time of arrest or after impoundment at
the police station a short time thereafter, as the moving vehicle
emergency still exists." 7 Once again, the Court examined the
practical effect of the peculiar characteristics of the automobile on
the application of the fourth amendment."8 The apparent effect of
the Chambers holding was the elimination of a warrant requirement
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 49-50 (1937). The security of the dwelling house has always
been of paramount concern to all Americans and no doubt was the basic concern of the
framers when drafting the fourth amendment. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8
(1977). The Supreme Court has been steadfast in ensuring that this sanctity is not unreasona-
bly invaded by the government.
Carroll did not speak of any invasion of privacy brought about by the search although
subsequent and present day decisions are intimately concerned with this topic. See notes 208-
09 and accompanying text infra.
195. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). -
196. Id. at 51-52.
197. Id. at 52. Professor LaFave suggests that the exigent circumstances no longer exist
once the vehicle is in custody. 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 528 (1978). Realistically, it
is hard to visualize how an automobile can be mobile while impounded and under police
supervision, and Justice White did not elaborate.
198. 399 U.S. at 51-52. The practical considerations noted by the Court are: the car is
movable; the occupants are alerted and the car's contents may never be found again if a
warrant must be obtained; the car may be taken out of the jurisdiction and tracing the car
and searching it an extended time later would permit instruments or fruits of the crime to
be removed prior to search.
In Chambers, the occupants were arrested at night, making a careful search impractical
and unsafe for the officers. Alternatively, taking the vehicle to the station house promoted
the car's safety and the owner's convenience. Id. at 52 n.10.
A more recent example of how the Supreme Court applies Chambers can be seen in Texas
v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975), in which it was held proper for officers with probable cause to
conduct a warrantless search of an automobile on the scene, to delay the search until a later
time at the police station. The dissenters, Justices Marshall and Brennan, felt a factual
difference made this case dissimilar to Chambers. In Chambers, the car was taken from a
dark parking lot at night and searched later at the station for practical reasons, while in
White, the seizure of the car took place at 1:30 in the afternoon in front of the First National
Bank of Amarillo. To the dissenters, it did not appear that an immediate search was either
impractical or unsafe for the arresting officers.
One commentator analogized the Court's treatment of people and cars in public places
and stated that after White, the Burger Court's position became clear:
Henceforth, automobiles, at least those found in a public place, are evidently to
be treated like people, also found in a public place. If the police have probable
cause to search and seize a car or to arrest a person, they may act without the
prior approval of a magistrate even when there is a reasonable opportunity to seek
such approval.
Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L. REv. 335, 407 (1978).
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for any automobile search.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, "I however, the Court addressed
this misconception stating, "[t]he word 'automobile' is not a talis-
man in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and
disappears." ' In its plurality opinion, the Court found that exigent
circumstances simply were not present and the opportunity for
search was not "fleeting." The police had known for some time of
the role of the car in the crime, thus probable cause existed well
before arrest. Moreover, when Coolidge was arrested in his home,
the unoccupied car was parked on private property and was hardly
mobile.20' Under these circumstances the Court held that the auto-
mobile exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement
was irrelevant.
02
More recently the scope of the automobile exception to the
fourth amendment under the Carroll-Chambers doctrine was exam-
ined in Cardwell v. Lewis. 20 1 Once again the Supreme Court failed
to muster a majority to agree on an analysis in this admittedly
difficult area. 0' The Court was faced with a warrantless seizure of
an automobile from a public parking lot and subsequent examina-
tion of the exterior of the car at the police impoundment lot. 201 The
plurality framed the issue thusly: "[W]hether the examination of
an automobile's exterior upon probable cause invades a right to
privacy which the interposition of a warrant requirement is meant
to protect."
Writing for the plurality, Justice Blackmun noted that the
mobile nature of an automobile was only one reason for having a less
stringent warrant requirement for automobiles as compared to
199. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
200. Id. at 461-62.
201. Id. at 460. In a footnote, the plurality of Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan and
Marshall examined the term "mobile" as it applies to impounded cars. They recognized that
any car is mobile to the extent that someone with keys could slip by the police and drive it
away, but there was "no constitutional significance to this sort of mobility." Id. at 461 n.18.
202. Id. at 462. Because the search was invalid under the reasoning of both Carroll and
Chambers, Dyke v. Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) controlled. Dyke held that if a
search of an automobile is impermissible at the time of arrest, it is invalid if conducted later
at the station.
203. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
204. Justices Blackmun, White, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger made up the plural-
ity. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam has stated, "[flor clarity and consistency, the law of
the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court's most successful product . Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974).
205. 417 U.S. at 587-88.
206. Id. at 589. The existence of probable cause was not at issue, having been conceded
by the defendant. Id. at 592.
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houses.207 He continued by addressing directly the expectation of
privacy in automobiles. Finding that automobiles are used primar-
ily for transportation and only rarely serve as a residence or as a
repository of personal effects and that its occupants are usually in
plain view, 08 Justice Blackmun stated "the search of an automobile
is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment than the search of one's person or of a building."20 It is thus
apparent from Lewis that one's expectation of privacy in an auto-
mobile is diminished when compared to one's expectations of pri-
vacy in his home. How far it should be diminished is the critical
question. The Court in the past and in the recent cases of Rakas v.
Illinois2tO and Delaware v. Prousel1' has struggled with this problem.
Before turning to these recent cases, however, a discussion of an-
other area of law uniquely related to privacy concepts surrounding
automobiles is relevant.
Chimel v. California2 12 stands for the proposition that a person
and anything within his immediate control may be searched inci-
dent to arrest. "Within one's immediate control" has come to mean
those areas where a person might obtain weapons or conceal or
destroy evidentiary items. The question arises, how does the Chimel
207. 417 U.S. at 589.90.
208. Id. at 590. The last factor could be called into serious doubt today for cars with
darkly tinted windows. Although travelling on public thoroughfares, the occupants and con-
tents of these autos are definitely not in plain view. Whether this is an important distinction
remains to be seen. It may be one of the factors taken into account after Rakas in determining
one's expectation of privacy. The argument might be made, however, that it costs extra
money to have heavily tinted windows, so only the more affluent could afford them and thus
an unequal expectation of privacy could be purchased.
In addition, the contents of an automobile are often not readily viewable because of
precautions taken to make them more private, for instance, locking items in the trunk. This
should be a factor in determining whether one's legitimate expectations of privacy in a motor
vehicle are less diminished because of the purposeful manner in which one attempts to make
items private in a public vehicle. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (shutting the door of the phone
booth to make private a conversation in a public place).
209. Id. at 590 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring)). The plurality quickly noted, however, that merely because one desires
to be mobile and use the public thoroughfare, he does not waive his right to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion. 417 U.S. at 591. While the plurality opinion noted that
any invasion of privacy caused by the examination of the right rear tire and the taking of
exterior paint scrapings was "abstract and theoretical," id. at 592, the dissent disagreed.
They pointed out that the plurality had drawn a distinction between the car in Coolidge
which had been parked on private property and the car in Lewis which was in a public lot,
but had neglected to mention that the car had been parked in the public lot in compliance
with a police request to appear. Id. at 57.
210. 439 U.S. 128 (1978); see notes 253-61 and accompanying text infra.
211. 440 U.S. 648 (1979); see notes 262-81 and accompanying text infra.
212. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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rationale apply to searches of vehicles made incident to arrest?"'
It must be remembered that searches incident to lawful arrest
comprise one of the narrow exceptions to the general principle of the
fourth amendment that searches are unconstitutional unless au-
thorized by a prior neutral magistrate."' The particular exception
outlined in Chimel serves two primary purposes: (1) to permit the
arresting officer to disarm a suspect for his own safety and to pre-
vent any escape attempts, and (2) to preclude a suspect from de-
stroying or concealing evidence.2t 5 A search extending beyond these
limitations violates the policies of Chimel.
Once a person has been ordered out of his car, is the area within
his immediate control that which he presently can reach or that area
which he could have reached when he was seated in the vehicle?
Prior to Chimel, under the rationale of United States v.
Rabinowitz" ' and Harris v. United States,"7 a search of the entire
vehicle was permissible after a lawful arrest, except for minor traffic
violations.""
In light of the recent Supreme Court case of Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 1' in which the Court held that persons (including passen-
gers) riding in an automobile have no fourth amendment right not
to be ordered from their vehicle once a legitimate stop has been
made, the resolution of this problem is even more important. After
Chimel, once an arrestee has left the car and is under police control,
it would not apear that the vehicle is within his immediate control
any more than the bedroom of an individual who was arrested in his
living room is within that individual's immediate control. Most
courts agree that a car may not be searched incident to arrest after
the vehicle has been removed from the scene or the arrestee has been
removed from the vehicle. 20 On the other hand, courts have upheld
213. See Comment, Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle Searches,
17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 626 (1970) wherein the author proposes that the application of the Chimel
rule in auto searches be the same as in the area of residential searches.
214. See note 12 supra.
215. 395 U.S. at 762-63.
216. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
217. 331 U.S.. 145 (1947).
218. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), which recognized that as a search
incident to arrest must be contemporaneous with the arrest, a search of a vehicle at the police
station is simply not incident to the prior arrest of the occupants. See also Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) (search of auto held not pursuant to arrest when
car parked outside jail where arrestee taken).
219. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
220. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 501 (1978); see United States v. Edwards, 554




vehicle searches as incident to arrest even where it appears highly
unlikely that an arrestee could gain access to the vehicle."2 ' The
additional factor of the automobile's mobility which played such an
important part in the Carroll-Chambers doctrine, no doubt has had
an effect on the courts' decisions.22 2 A noted commentator has criti-
cized the use of the mobility factor to somehow broaden the scope
of a permissible search incident to arrest because "the Chimel ra-
tionale relates to the arrestee's access to the place searched rather
than the risk that the evidence might otherwise become unavaila-
ble. ' 2 The Chimel limitations on a search incident to arrest apply
in a person's home. Should not these same limitations apply when
the arrestee is outside his car, thereby forbidding warrantless
searches of any part of the vehicle not within his immediate
control?
22'
True, Lewis pointed out a few reasons why one should expect
less privacy in an automobile than in his home: the use of public
thoroughfares, exposure to public view, the car as a means of trans-
portation rather than a residence. 225 Other facts quickly come to
221. See, e.g., Application of Kiser, 419 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1969) (police could search
under blanket on back seat of car because defendant was "within leaping range").
See also the recent case where the Terry pat-down limited search was extended to the
vehicle in which the suspect is riding, United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1978)
(with the defendant at the back fender of the car the policeman placed his hand under the
front seat discovering dynamite).
The Fifth Circuit does not follow this Terry approach to vehicle pat-down once the
suspects have exited. See Government of the Canal Zone v. Bender, 573 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir.
1978).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1973) (upholding search
of attach6 case which was two feet from defendant on the back seat of car when he was
arrested. Exigent factors justifying the agent's actions were the "extremely mobile" objects:
the automobile and the attach6 case); see notes 8-21 and accompanying text supra.
223. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 500 (1978). The Supreme Court has not yet ruled
directly on the constitutionality of a warrantless search of an automobile incident to an arrest
and thus it remains a gray area. In Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), the Court
permitted a full search of a suspect taken into custody for driving without a valid operator's
license even though the officer had no fear of the arrestee being armed or dangerous. The
Court, however, did not touch upon any issue concerning search of the auto incident to the
lawful arrest. See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (same).
224. The factors Professor LaFave would examine are: (1) whether or not the arrestee
was placed in some sort of restraints; (2) the position of the defendant and the arresting officer
in relation to the vehicle; (3) the ease or difficulty of gaining entry to the vehicle or of gaining
access to the particular container or enclosure therein searched; (4) the number of officers
present in relation to the number of arrestees or other persons. 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE 502-03 (1978).
Of course, in every search and seizure case the facts and circumstances determine the
reasonableness of the search and the ultimate outcome. The privacy aspect of the automobile
as viewed in modern society, however, would dictate the weight to be given the factors
delineated
225. See notes 203-09 and accompanying text supra.
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mind when viewing the "public" aspect of the automobile: the vari-
ety of ways in which the government regulates autos-inspections,
registration, licensing, traffic laws, insurance, parking, etc. As the
Court pointed out in Cady v. Dombroski,12 the extent of police-
citizen contact involving motor vehicles is much greater than police-
citizen contact in a home.'" Although such contact often arises in
regard to criminal or vehicular statutory violations, a great deal
results from noncriminal activities, i.e., accidents, disabled vehi-
cles, or other community caretaking functions.228
Yet, however "public" an automobile might seem, all privacy
is not discarded when one steps into a vehicle. The fourth amend-
ment still stands as a protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures of autos. Granted that there is some degree of privacy to
be had in relation to the use of a motor vehicle, where is the line to
be drawn? What degree of privacy can we expect in our automobiles
today in light of its historical treatment and recent cases?
The watershed case of Katz v. United States"' permeates this
entire inquiry just as it did the standing inquiry. 30 Katz is most
noteworthy for the proposition that "[tihe Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places" and "what [a person] seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected."'3 The Court's caveat, however, was that "what
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.2 32 While
at first glance these latter two quotes appear to be diametrically
opposed, Katz provides the distinction. Katz was in a public place,
a glass-enclosed telephone booth, where all the world could see him.
Although he was in an area accessible to the public and knowingly
exposed, what he sought to preserve as private was his conversation.
226. 413 U.S. 440 (1973).
227. Id. at 441.
228. Id. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Cady, based the constitutional
differences between searches of homes and vehicles on the ambulatory character of automo-
biles and the fact that extensive and often noncriminal contact with cars brings officials into
plain view of criminal evidence. Id. at 442.
The effect of the holding in Cady is that a warrantless search of an automobile is legiti-
mate even where the possibilities of the vehicle being removed or evidence in it being de-
stroyed are remote or nonexistent. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SwzURE 233 (1978).
229. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
230. See notes 35-36, 54-56 & 91 and accompanying text supra.
231. 389 U.S. at 351. The Court rejected a trespass doctrine under which a fourth amend-
ment violation turned on whether or not there was a physical intrusion into a given enclosure,
thus overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and Goldman v. United
States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 389 U.S. at 351, 353.
232. Id. at 351.
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He manifested this by shutting the door of the booth, thereby seek-
ing to exclude the uninvited ear.2 Thus, his conversation was con-
stitutionally protected from a search and seizure in violation of the
fourth amendment. The government's eavesdropping activities
"violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied." '' The hold-
ing in Katz expanded the fourth amendment to protect people from
unreasonable governmental intrusion into their legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy.
2 35
After Katz, however, what expectations of privacy are consid-
ered legitimate or constitutionally justifiable? The answer to this
question can only come from a delicate balancing of the present day
societal standards, customs, and values which define privacy,
against the need for the various techniques and mechanisms of an
efficient law enforcement body. A workable constitutional balance
must be struck between the public and private interests at stake. 38
An analysis of the latest Supreme Court cases will outline more
clearly how the reasonable expectation of privacy test expounded in
Katz has fared in automobile-related cases.
In United States v. Chadwick,27 the Court distinguished be-
tween the legitimate expectation of privacy in an automobile versus
that in personal luggage. A 200-pound double-locked footlocker con-
taining marijuana was placed in the trunk of Chadwick's car. While
the trunk of the car was still open and before the car had been
233. Id. at 352.
234. Id. Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, formulated a two-fold requirement to
determine whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy. First, whether a person has exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy and
second, whether the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."
Id. at 360-61.
Professor LaFave criticizes the first requirement of a subjective expectation as a poor
prerequisite to a finding that a search has taken place because it distorts and limits the Katz
rule. Our expectations are merely a reflection of the laws in force as they shape our rules,
customs and values. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 230 (1978). Justice Harlan himself
rejected the first prerequisite in his dissent in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
235. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977). Just how far this expansion of
the coverage of the fourth amendment has gone since Katz is impossible to tell. 1 W. LAFAvE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 229 (1978).
236. Justice Harlan reached a similar conclusion in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971), stating: "This question must, in my view, be answered by assessing the nature of a
particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security
balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement." Id. at 786
(Harlan, J., dissenting). It must be noted, however, that Justice Harlan did not consider
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), as a retreat from the propositions of Katz and
Chimel, but noted that moving vehicles have always presented a "special fourth amendment
problem." Id. at 784 n.20.
237. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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started, the three respondents were arrested.118 Although the agents
had probable cause to believe the trunk contained contraband, 231.no
search warrant was obtained. The footlocker remained under the
exclusive control of the federal officers and it was opened an hour
and a half after the arrests.
20
Flying in the face of the established preference for warrants, the
government argued initially that the "Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause protects only interests traditionally identified with the
home. 12 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, quickly
rejected this argument stating that the fourth amendment protects
not only "specifically designated locales. . . . [But] it protects
people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legiti-
mate expectations of privacy.2 4 Because a warrant aids in provid-
ing this protection, the issue framed was whether under the facts of
the case a warrantless search was unreasonable.
24 3
The Court noted that by placing personal effects into a double-
locked footlocker, the respondents manifested their expectation that
the contents inside would remain free from public intrusion. The
Court compared this to the locking of the door of one's home and
held that "one who safeguards his personal possessions in this man-
ner is due the protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant
Clause.
244
The government next analogized the mobility of the footlocker
to that of an automobile, maintaining that warrantless searches
238. Id. at 4.
239. Factors giving rise to probable cause were: (1) the trunk appeared unusually heavy
to railroad officials in San Diego; (2) one respondent matched a profile used to spot drug
traffickers; (3) the trunk leaked talcum power which is used often to mask the odor of
marijuana; and, (4) a trained dog signalled the presence of a controlled substance inside the
locker. Id. at 3-4.
Whether the use of the dog's sensitive nose was a search in itself was not mentioned by
the Court. See Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to Privacy: Some Thoughts
on Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. REV. 75 (1976).
240. 433 U.S. at 4.
241. Id. at 6. The government contended that only homes, offices and private communi-
cations were meant to be protected by the fourth amendment warrant requirement. Id. at 7.
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist in
dissent, severely castigated the Department of Justice for attempting "to vindicate an ex-
treme view of the Fourth Amendment that would restrict the protection of the Warrant
Clause to private dwellings and a few other 'high privacy' areas." Id. at 17. As Justice
Brennan pointed out, it appears the Justice Department temporarily forgot its primary mis-
sion of protecting the constitutional liberties of the people of the United States and put forth
"extreme and dubious legal arguments." Id. at 16.
242. Id. at 7.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 11.
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based on probable cause should be permitted. "5 The Chief Justice
refused to accept the analogy finding that "a person's expectations
of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an
automobile." ' The Court made it clear that the diminished expec-
tation of privacy in automobiles simply did not apply to double-
locked footlockers-luggage contents are not open to the continuous
public and official scrutiny to which automobiles are subject. 4' The
majority also harkened back to the primary purpose of cars, getting
from point A to point B, noting that a footlocker is intended primar-
ily as a repository for personal items. 48 In addition, the footlocker
in Chadwick had no mobility factor since it was under the exclusive
control of federal agents with no danger that it could be removed
before a search warrant could be obtained.2 14 The Court found that
the defendants were entitled to a determination by a neutral magis-
trate as to whether a warrant should have issued "before their pri-
vacy interests in the contents of the footlocker were invaded. 250
245. Id. at 12.
246. Id. at 13.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. In distinguishing the situation where police have an automobile secured and it is
considered mobile, the Court noted that secure storage facilities may not be available and
its size and inherent mobility makes it particularly susceptible to theft or vandalism. Id. at
13 n.7.
250. Id. at 15-16. In addition, the Court rejected the government's third argument that
the search had been incident to arrest under Chimel, since the search did not take place until
an hour and a half after arrest. Id. at 14-15.
In Chadwick it was merely a coincidence that the footlocker was in the trunk of a parked
automobile. The obvious question arises, what if the connection was more than coincidental
and the car had been mobile when the arrest was made? Could the footlocker have been
legitimately searched pursuant to the automobile exception? The majority did not touch upon
this question but Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion left this query open and said it
was by no means clear whether this locked container could have been searched under this
exception. 433 U.S. at 17 n.1. Nor did he feel it could have been searched under the Chimel
rationale since even though the defendants were seated on the locked trunk, in his view, it
was not within their immediate control, meaning they could not obtain a weapon from it or
destroy evidence within it. Id. at n.2; cf. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (Court
found exigent circumstances in a potentially mobile car).
The dissenters, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, agreed that under the automobile
exception, once the respondents started to drive away, the car could have been seized and
the footlocker and any other contents searched without a warrant. 433 U.S. at 22-23. The
dissenters also question the distinction between a footlocker and an auto for mobility pur-
poses, feeling that both items, if legitimately seized, can be later searched without the
necessity of obtaining a warrant. In addition, the dissent would have found the instant
search valid under Chimel and also under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
If the car had properly been impounded, the contents could have been inventoried without
any showing of probable cause. See Comment, Automobile Inventories and the Fourth
Amendment: South Dakota v. Opperman, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 177 (1977).
This question was recently answered by the Court in Arkansas v. Sanders, 47
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It appeaied from Chadwick that the Court regarded highly the
preference for warrants which is a foundation of the fourth amend-
ment. At the same time, however, the Justices cited Lewis with
favor, judicially reaffirming the concept of diminished expectations
of privacy in automobiles."' Unfortunately, the Court chose not to
delineate specifically the origins of the expectation of privacy in a
footlocker. As a result, it cannot be gleaned from the opinion
whether the greater privacy expectation comes from the fact that
the footlocker was locked or that it was generally an item which
contains personal goods, or both. Surely, an automobile often con-
tains personal items and can also be locked. If the Court in
Chadwick really intended to establish a preference for warrants
wherever possible, the search of a seized automobile arguably would
require a neutral magistrate's evaluation whenever not greatly im-
practical.' "
In Rakas, the Supreme Court directly addressed the expecta-
tions of privacy in automobiles. The majority attempted to justify
its holding by stating that traditionally "cars are not to be treated
identically with houses or apartments for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses. 253 Careful inspection, however, will reveal that this state-
ment is unresponsive to the Court's rephrased inquiry. No support
whatever was given by the majority for their bland conclusion that
there are simply no privacy rights in a locked glove compartment
or under the front passenger seat of an automobile. 5 '
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell engaged in a bit more
U.S.L.W. 4783 (U.S. June 20, 1979). There, the Court, faced with this very issue, held that
in the absence of exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant before
searching luggage taken from an auto properly stopped and searched for contraband. Justices
Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented.
251. 433 U.S. at 12; see notes 203-09 and accompanying text supra.
252. On its face the warrant clause does not distinguish between a requirement for
"persons, houses, papers and effects," much less a distinction between different effects. Of
course, the "automobile exception" is presently established law. 433 U.S. at 8.
For a look at problems with warrant requirements and prior judicial approval, see Yackle,
supra note 198; 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 233 (1978). See also Note, Mobility Reconsi-
dered: Extending the Carroll Doctrine to Movable Items, 58 IOWA L. REV. 1134, 1156 (1973).
253. 439 U.S. at 148 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977); Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
Justice Powell, in the concurring opinion, enumerated reasons for the distinction:
"Automobiles operate on public streets, they are served in public places, they stop frequently,
they are usually parked in public places, their interiors are highly visible, and they are subject
to extensive regulation and inspection." Id. at 154 n.2.
254. Id. The defendants had made no claim that they had any expectation of privacy in
the areas of the auto searched, but had argued that they were legitimately on the premises
and thus had standing to contest the search. This argument was rejected as the Court severely
limited the Jones holding. Id. at 147-48.
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analysis before rejecting the defendants' privacy interest claim. As
he saw it, the issue was: "[W]hether one's claim to privacy from
government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding
circumstances. '"I In determining the reasonableness of the defen-
dants' claim, Justice Powell relied heavily on the historical fourth
amendment treatment afforded automobiles, emphasizing that
the defendants here had no "control" over the car or its compart-
ments.25 The concurring opinion thus makes a bald value judgment
as to the degree of privacy passengers expect while riding in a car. 57
Obviously, Justice Powell believes that they expect little, "as the
shared experience of us all bears witness." 5
The four dissenters in Rakas took the opposite approach to the
privacy aspect, noting that any search, including an automobile
search, was a substantial invasion of privacy.2 5 The relevant in-
quiry, according to the dissent, was "[wihether petitioner had a
reasonable expectation [on his part] of freedom from governmental
intrusion upon those premises.."260 Finding precisely such a reasona-
ble expectation, the dissenters would have upheld Jones and af-
forded the passengers standing. The divergence in the values of the
justices in this volatile area is illustrated by the dissent's perception
that "[t]he Court's holding is contrary not only to our past deci-
sions and the logic of the Fourth Amendment, but also to the
everyday expectations of privacy that we all share. ,2'
In striking contrast to Rakas' effective emasculation of the pri-
vacy rights of automobile passengers, the Court, in a case decided
less than four months later, went to great pains to articulate that
the fourth amendment does attach to an individual operating or
traveling in an automobile.
In Delaware v. Prouse,2"I a patrolman stopped an automobile
occupied by the respondent"' and seized marijuana in plain view on
255. Id. at 152.
256. Id. at 154. He admits that a closer case would be presented if one of the defend-
ants had a key to the glove compartment. Id. at 155 n.4. Of course this does absolutely
nothing to establish any standards for policemen to guide their conduct and reverts back to
property/ownership concepts which the majority "tells us" have been rejected.
257. See notes 203-09 and accompanying text supra.
258. 439 U.S. at 155.
259. Id. at 157. The dissenting opinion, as well as the concurrence, looked to past
Supreme Court decisions and found that mere passengers in automobiles were entitled to
reach the merits when contesting a search and seizure. Id. at 158-59.
260. See note 113 supra.
261. 439 U.S. at 167 (emphasis added).
262. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
263. In its opinion, the Supreme Court of Delaware referred to respondent as the operator
of the vehicle. State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359, 1361 (1978). There is, however, testimony and
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the car floor. Respondent was subsequently indicted for illegal pos-
session of a controlled substance. At a hearing on respondent's mo-
tion to suppress the marijuana seized as a result of the stop, the
patrolman testified that he had not observed any traffic or equip-
ment violations nor any suspicious activity, and that he had made
the stop only to check the driver's license and registration." ' The
police officer characterized the stop as "routine" and explained, "I
saw the car in the area and was not answering any complaints so I
decided to pull them off."2 5 The trial court granted the motion to
suppress, finding the stop to be violative of the fourth amendment,
and the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed.6 7 The Supreme Court
of the United States granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between
the jurisdictions.' In an eight-to-one decision 68 delivered by Jus-
tice White, the Court held that such discretionary spot checks are
repugnant to the fourth amendment as unreasonable intrusions and
exercises of state discretion.270 Even though the purpose of the stop
is limited to a license check and the resulting detention is quite
brief, the Court reasoned that the stop nonetheless constitutes a
seizure within the meaning of the amendment."' The majority then
balanced the intrusion involved in such a seizure against the inter-
est of the state in promoting public safety upon its highways.272 In
determining that the state's interest must give way to the rights of
those who travel on public roads, the majority decision relied upon
the privacy expectations of automobile passengers to strike down
evidence which brings into question this label; see 440 U.S. at 650 n.1.
264. 440 U.S. at 650.
265. Id. at 650-51.
266. Id. at 651.
267. State v. Prouse, 382 A.2d 1359 (1978).
268. Five jurisdictions were in accord with Delaware: United States v. Montgomery, 561
F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971); State v.
Ochoa, 23 Ariz. App. 510, 534 P.2d 441 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d
1097 (1976); People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973). Six other jurisdictions held to the
contrary: United States v. Jenkins, 528 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1975); Myricks v. United States,
370 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 386 U.S. 1015 (1967); Palmore v. United States, 290
A.2d 573 (D.C. 1972), aff'd on jurisdictional grounds only, 411 U.S. 389 (1973); State v.
Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975); State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9
(1973); Leonard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973).
269. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Stevens joined. Justice Rehn-
quist filed the lone dissenting opinion.
270. 440 U.S. at 663.
271. Id. at 653 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-58 (1976);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)).
272. Id. at 658-61.
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government intrusions inside the doors and windows of motor vehi-
cles.
Citing Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.27 and Camera v. Municipal
Court,"27 the Court stated that an individual operating or traveling
in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectations of privacy
simply because the automobile and its use are subject to govern-
ment regulation." 5
Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode
of transportation to and from one's home, workplace, and leisure
activities. Many people spend more hours each day traveling in
cars than walking on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a
greater sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automo-
bile than they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other
modes of travel. Were the individual subject to unfettered gov-
ernmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the'
security granted by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously
circumscribed."'
Although the Court in Rakas distinguished an automobile from
a dwelling place, holding that the petitioners had no "legitimate
expectation of privacy," ' in Prouse the majority analogized the
privacy rights of automobile passengers to people in their homes or
in public places. "[P]eople," Justice White wrote, "are not shorn
of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their
homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those inter-
ests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles.11271
It is clearly inconsistent that in one instance the Court relied upon
the unique nature of an automobile to deny occupants the protec-
tion of the fourth amendment, and yet, in another instance some
fifteen weeks later, the same Court emphasized that one's privacy
rights are not denied merely because he is an automobile occupant!
Although the Court in Prouse speaks as a champion of automo-
biie passenger privacy, its opinion only prohibits warrantless ran-
dom stops of automobiles when the police officer involved lacks an
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a violation of applicable
273. 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrant required for federal inspection under interstate com-
merce power of health and safety of workplace).
274. 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrant required for inspection of residence for municipal fire
code violations).
275. 440 U.S. at 662.
276. Id. at 662-63.
277. 439 U.S. at 148.
278. 440 U.S. at 663. "We have on numerous occasions pointed out that cars are not to
be treated identically with houses or apartments for Fourth Amendment purposes." 439 U.S.
at 148.
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motor vehicle law has occurred or that the car is otherwise subject
to a stop. Furthermore, the holding does not preclude a state from
developing less intrusive and discretionary methods for spot
checks."'
Although the Prouse decision would still permit the stopping of
automobiles without probable cause in a roadblock situation, it has
placed limitations upon the exercise of police discretion randomly
to stop and search an automobile. The opinion overrules the statu-
tory and case law of many jurisdictions which had previously sus-
tained random, warrantless automobile stops for the sole purpose of
checking for a valid license or registration.10 The most significant
contributions of Prouse, therefore, are a heightened recognition of
an automobile occupant's expectation of privacy and a mandate
from the Court that government entities must exercise constraint
when intruding into an automobile."'
VI. CONCLUSION
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis commented in 1890 that
"[plolitical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet
the demands of society."' 2 It is submitted that the time has come
for the Court to acknowledge the modern role of the automobile in
today's society and the corresponding expanded expectations of pri-
vacy of automobile occupants.
The determination of every case in which the Court seeks to
279. 440 U.S. at 663.
280. See, e.g., United States v. Berry, 369 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1966); Rodgers v. United
States, 362 F.2d 358 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 993 (1966); Welch v. United States,
361 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 876 (1966). In a concurring opinion,
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Powell, emphasized the permissible nonrandom methods
of stopping automobiles. For example, stopping all traffic at a roadblock-type stop is ex-
pressly authorized under this decision.
281. While Rakas was a five-to-four decision, the Prouse opinion saw eight justices siding
with the majority. Justice White, the author of the Rakas dissent, had the opportunity in
Prouse to write the majority opinion and vigorously assert the privacy rights of automobile
passengers which had been so drastically reduced in Rakas. Yet, the Prouse decision does not
overrule Rakas. It merely prohibits random automobile stops for the sole purpose of checking
auto registration and driver licenses. Though Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Powell and Blackmun were willing in Prouse to protect automobile occupants from brief spot
checks to enforce motor vehicle registration laws, they were unwilling in Rakas to allow the
"victim" of an automobile search who could assert no possessory interest in the automobile
to challenge the constitutionality of that search. On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist felt
that "[tihe whole point of enforcing motor vehicle safety regulations is to remove from the
road the unlicensed driver before he demonstrates why he is unlicensed." 440 U.S. at 666
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
282. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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decide precisely what expectations of privacy are legitimate in a free
society, necessarily calls for a balancing between unduly hampering
the law enforcement process and invading the privacy of individu-
als. '3 A balance is called for, however, because expectations of pri-
vacy should not be waived automatically when one steps from a
home into an automobile.
The "legitimate expectation of privacy" test utilized in Rakas
is praiseworthy for its recognition that social values may change and
for its flexibility as our institutions and expectations change. The
Rakas Court is to be criticized, however, for failing to articulate
clearly its reasons for denying privacy rights to automobile occu-
pants. The Court's reliance upon possessory interests as a test for
privacy expectations is an unrealistic sidestepping which removes
from the expectation test the flexibility to recognize society's chang-
ing values. A more realistic approach would have been for the Court
to have recognized the crucial role motor vehicles play in our lives8 4
and the fact that Americans often seek privacy in their automo-
biles.215
By hinging its decision on the standing doctrine rather than
addressing the exclusionary rule, the Court in Rakas has denied
many automobile passengers the right even to challenge the reason-
ableness of a search and seizure. ' The Court has restricted the
exclusionary rule without a scintilla of discussion concerning the
viability or merits of the rule. Such an approach may result in an
''open season" on automobile searches and leaves unanswered vital
questions concerning future applicability of the exclusionary rule in
cases which go beyond the automobile.
Yet despite the Rakas Court's backhanded attack on the ex-
clusionary rule, its rejection of antiquated standing tests and its at-
283. A balance must be made "between the public interest and the individual's right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
284. See notes 1 and 2 and accompanying text supra.
285. Yackle, supra note 198. Indeed, many modern motor vehicles have acquired the
characteristics of homes, i.e., mobile homes, recreational vehicles and all-purpose vans. See
United States v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975) (court permitted a safety check of a
mobile home after the suspect was in custody); see also B. MODES & G. ROBERsON, THE LAW
OF MoaiLE HOMES (3d ed. 1974). Furthermore, automobiles are often used as protected con-
tainers under lock and key. Note, supra note 193, at 841.
286. One legislature obviously thinks enough of the privacy interests of a passenger in
an automobile to have promulgated a statute which creates a presumption that a firearm in
a motor vehicle is the property .of all inhabitants of the vehicle. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1979). The statute passed constitutional muster in County Court v. Allen,
99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979). Because the statute was upheld, it would seem that a passenger would
have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to a firearm located in an automobile.
19791
144 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tempt to address substantive fourth amendment inquiries is a step
in the right direction. Courts will now focus on the petitioner's legit-
imate expectation of privacy in the area searched before allowing a
search to be challenged. This will ensure that only those whose
personal rights have been violated will be permitted to assert fourth
amendment protection and thus valuable court time will be saved.
In addressing the standing of automobile passengers, however,
the Rakas Court failed to look beyond historical notions that auto-
mobiles are afforded only a diminished expectation of privacy. 87
The Court should break free of the view that automobiles are used
merely for transportation and thus are entitled to a lesser degree of
privacy than are other areas or properties. Instead, the Supreme
Court should follow its own progressive lead established in Prouse,
which recognizes that automobile occupants deserve fourth amend-
ment protection.
The nature and use of the automobile in modern society and the
common expectations of freedom from governmental intrusion de-
mand that motor vehicles be granted a greater degree of privacy.
Anyone legitimately in a home or automobile should be allowed to
contest the fruits of a search and seizure in a motion to suppress.
Government invasion into these two areas is a personal invasion into
personal security. This is not to advocate a strict "legitimately on
[the] premises" test for these two locations; rather, it must be
judicially recognized that when one is legitimately present in either
place in today's society, he expects a degree of privacy which is "one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 2 8
This alternative provides a "bright line"' 1 for both the police
and the courts to use in assessing the constitutionality of any search
taking place in these two areas. Thus, Justice White's fear in Rakas
that the police will declare an open season on automobiles could be
obviated.290 Under Rakas, police are not deterred from making an
unlawful search which will invade a passenger's privacy, whether he
is an innocent victim of a search or its intended target. Also, because
after Rakas the courts no longer have the old standing pigeonholes
availabld', judges will be forced to decide what they believe society
thinks is an area where one reasonably expects privacy. In contrast
287. The reasonableness of expectation of privacy is not reduced because an intrusion
upon it "has occurred often enough." United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 1973).
288. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
289. See note 114 supra.
290. See note 119 supra and accompanying text. "I can think of few issues more impor-
tant to a society than the amount of power that it permits its police to use without effective
control by law." Amsterdam, supra note 60, at 377.
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to the voluminous litigation which is inevitable until this area of the
law becomes settled or changed, the solution of allowing all people
legitimately present in a home or motor vehicle to challenge a
search will reduce the flow of litigation.
Secondly, the alternative offered herein does away with the
senseless distinctions which have emerged with respect to cases
dealing with legitimate expectations of privacy. For instance, in
Katz the defendant, by closing the door of a glass public telephone
booth, manifested his legitimate expectation of privacy to all the
world. Because of Rakas, however, a passenger who, with permission
of the owner, is in a car with dark tinted windows and closed, locked
doors, does not have any legitimate expectations of privacy. In
Jones, the defendant had standing because he exercised complete
dominion and control over an apartment and could exclude others
from it;91 under Rakas, a passenger occupying a seat in a car who
can likewise exclude anyone from entering the car, has no expecta-
tion of privacy. In Chadwick, the suspects could manifest an ex-
pectation of privacy in a locked footlocker, but now an occupant in
a locked auto cannot manifest the same expectation. These confus-
ing distinctions and difficult property concepts as they relate to
one's expectation of privacy can be avoided if the courts follow the
proposed suggestion.
Thirdly, the Supreme Court will be able to remain flexible in
its approach to other types of premises and not be tied to a stiff
"legitimately on [the] premises" test when determining what ex-
pectations of privacy modern society, as it evolves, is prepared to
accept as reasonable. 2 Expectations of privacy in business offices,
commercial warehouses, and other such locations, can develop with
an eye toward realistic expectations and changing values.
Finally, the authors' suggestion allows the government to con-
tinue its necessary regulation of automobiles while still respecting
individuals' right to privacy. There is an obvious need for extensive
government regulation of motor vehicles: to promote safety and
efficiency and to assure solvent defendants. Allowing guests in
homes and automobiles to contest invasions of their privacy in no
way infringes upon the government's ability to promulgate these
291. See note 9 and accompanying text supra; 439 U.S. at 149.
Just as DeForte reasonably expected only union employees and guests to enter the office
building, a passenger expects no one to enter the car without the owner/driver's permission.
See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
292. For example, Justice White in Mancusi did not wish to extend DeForte's right to
privacy in his office desk to the boundaries of the office door. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364, 377 (1968).
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vital regulations." 3
In addition to employing the reasoning presented above, it is
hoped that the Supreme Court will be true to a citizen's expecta-
tions of privacy in his car when analyzing Chimel problems. Once
an individual is in custody and presents no additional danger to the
police, anything not within his immediate control should not be
subject to a search without the safeguards provided by the proper
acquisition of a warrant. As the Court stated in Chimel, "[W]e can
see no reason why, simply because some interference with an indi-
vidual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place,
further intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the ab-
sence of a warrant that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise
require.""'
Katz, Chadwick and Prouse all recognize that a person's desire
for privacy and freedom from unbridled government intrusion may
be constitutionally protected even in a public place. It is time for
the Supreme Court to recognize that the protections provided by the
fourth amendment extend to certain areas around a person and that
these areas move with him and change with the environment in
which he finds himself.2 5 In society today one such area deserving
of a legitimate expectation of privacy is the automobile.
293. Thus, an automobile will retain its public aspect in view of its use on public high-
ways and places accessible to the public. Police will still be able to look into a vehicle to
observe what is exposed to public view. See, e.g., Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975) (right of privacy does not extend to commission of an act of
sodomy in a car parked on a public highway); United States v. Gunn, 428 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.
1970) (serial numbers on tires); State v. Cohn, 284 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (vehicle
identification number can be read through the windshield).
294. 394 U.S. at 766 n.12 (emphasis added).
295. United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 866 n.4 (7th Cir. 1975).
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